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Abstract 
 
Low hour, inexperienced General Aviation (GA) pilots account for the majority of 
weather-related incidents, which often result in fatalities. Previous research identifies poor 
preflight planning practices and a lack of aviation weather knowledge as key contributing factors 
to the high novice private pilot accident and fatality rate. Research invested into resolving these 
issues often attempt to introduce new inflight weather technology to assist pilots with weather 
avoidance. However, these interventions usually result in pilots using the information to 
strategically navigate closer to degraded weather conditions (Beringer & Ball, 2004; Burgess & 
Thomas, 2004). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a 
performance support tool for weather preflight (PWDST) on pilots’ preflight performance and 
inflight performance. Seventy-eight private pilots (Mage = 20.15, SD = 2.56) without instrument 
ratings were recruited from a Southeastern US university. Forty-one visual flight rule (VFR) 
private pilots were randomly assigned to the control group (no preflight decision tool) and 37 
VFR private pilots were assigned to the experimental group (preflight decision tool). Participants 
performed a weather preflight and a simulated flight for one VFR into instrument meteorological 
conditions scenario (i.e., VFR to IMC). Results indicated that participants in the PWDST 
condition examined significantly more weather products and reported higher weather awareness 
following the preflight activities than did participants in the control group. Furthermore, results 
also indicated that participants in the PWDST condition spent significantly less time in IMC than 
participants in the control condition. Additionally, results revealed that preflight decision-making 
was predicted by preflight performance and inflight decision-making was predicted by pilots’ 
awareness of weather inflight.   
 iv 
 Findings from this study suggest that preflight weather performance support tools may 
be able to assist low hour inexperienced with preflight and inflight performance. 
Keywords: Aviation Weather, Performance Support Tools, Automation, Flight decision-making 
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AVIATION WEATHER PREFLIGHT DECISION SUPPORT TOOL  
TO IMPROVE GA PILOTS PREFLIGHT AND INFLIGHT PERFORMANCE  
General Aviation (GA) incurs the majority of weather-related accidents within civil aviation 
operations. GA weather-related accidents have a very high fatality rate – a rate has been slowly 
decreasing over the last 30 years. Further investigation into the accident data reveals, VFR into 
IMC accidents account for the majority of weather-related fatalities. Previous research also 
indicates private pilots with low experience and pilots without their instrument rating were the 
most likely to fly VFR into IMC.  Moreover, pilots who fly VFR into IMC tend to have 
overconfidence in their abilities and a lack of weather knowledge. As a result, research efforts 
have been invested into solving the general aviation problem, and new technology, training, and 
understanding has been gathered and assimilated into GA operations. However, the “General 
Aviation problem”, specifically VFR into IMC, still persists. 
Underlying the stagnant GA aviation accident rate may be that pilots have limited 
understanding of weather products and theory which, in turn, may result in pilots having only 
rudimentary mental maps of inflight weather. Consequently, a lack of weather situational 
awareness and inadequate risk assessment may lead to poor decision-making and error. 
However, if pilots were provided a performance support tool to aid them in the preflight process 
for weather, pilots’ understanding of weather, weather-related decisions, and inflight weather-
related behavior may improve. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of a 
performance support tool for weather preflight on pilots’ preflight performance and inflight 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL AVIATION WEATHER PROBLEM 
Over the last 20 years, General Aviation (GA) accidents have accounted for the majority of 
civil aviation weather-related accidents. Additionally, GA weather accidents have included 
alarmingly high fatality rates (see figure 1). This issue has been a subject of concern for both the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 
The most dangerous of all GA weather-related accidents are VFR into IMC incidents. Research 
suggests VFR into IMC occur more frequently amongst low certificate and low hour pilots. This 
next section will review the GA accident rate and research on possible contributing factors.  
GA Weather Accident Rate 
 
The Federal Aviation Administration completed a detailed review of the General Aviation 
(GA) Weather-related accidents that occurred between 2003 and 2007 (FAA, 2010). The results 
indicated that general aviation (GA) operations incur the majority of weather-related accidents 
compared to Part 135 and 121 operations (FAA, 2010). In fact, between 2003 and 2007, 88% of 
weather-related accidents were defined as GA Operations. Research has also indicated that most 
weather-related accidents occurred during the day and while performing GA personal operations 
(FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016; Nall, 2008). Personal Part 91 flight operations accounted for 
1,105 of the cumulative 1,532 GA weather-related accidents between 2003 and 2007 (FAA, 
2010). In 2007, 39.4% of GA operations were personal flights. However, GA personal flights 
accounted for 69.1% of GA accidents and 72.9% of GA fatal accidents (Nall, 2008).  Additional 
study results reported that, between 2003 and 2007, 733 Part 91 weather-related accidents 
resulted in fatalities (FAA, 2010). However, the data indicates the weather-related accident 
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fatality rate has decreased, from 95 accidents resulting in fatalities in 2003, to 36 weather-related 
accidents in 2007 (FAA, 2010). Despite the decreasing fatality rate amongst GA weather-related 
accidents, the severe injury rate has remained stagnant at an average 32.2 % yearly rate (FAA, 
2010).  
Fultz & Ashley (2016) conducted a review of fatal GA weather accidents by analyzing 
accidents that occurred between 1982 and 2013. Research revealed between 1982 and 2013, 25% 
of 58,687 GA accidents identified weather as a primary contributing factor (Fultz & Ashley, 
2016).  Fortunately, GA weather-related accidents are on a declining trend (FAA, 2010; Fultz & 
Ashley, 2016; Nall, 2008). In particular, between 1982 and 2013, GA accidents have decreased 
by 50%, when considering GA accident subcategories, weather-related accidents have declined 
by 70% (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However the GA weather-related fatal accidents rate is 
decreasing at much slower rate than the overall decrease in GA weather-related accidents (Fultz 
& Ashley, 2016). 
 
Figure 1. Part 91 Weather-related Accidents by Injury Severity. This graph depicts Injury Severity of General Aviation Weather-
related Accidents between 2003 and 2007. 
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Weather Contributing Factors  
 
Certain hazardous weather phenomena can potentially have a severe, negative impact on 
flight performance. These include wind, visibility/ceiling, high density altitude, carburetor icing, 
updraft/downdraft, precipitation, turbulence, structural icing, wind shear, thunderstorm, thermal 
lift, temperature extremes, and lightning (FAA, 2010). Wind, visibility/ceiling, and high density 
altitude constitute the top three weather conditions with the most weather-related citations, with 
wind identified as the most prominent weather contributing factor, with 1,047 weather-related 
citations (FAA, 2010). In particular, crosswinds, gusts, and tail winds were highlighted as wind 
phenomena with the most citations (FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However, although wind 
is the most cited condition with 40% wind-related GA accidents, wind resulted in only 13% of 
GA fatal weather accidents. Capobianco and Lee (2001) claim wind related accidents’ low 
fatality rate may be a consequence of wind usually affecting flight performance during takeoff 
and landing procedures (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). 
In agreement with FAA (2010), Fultz & Ashley (2016) also found temperature, humidity, 
and pressure as weather phenomena contributing factors. These weather conditions were cited as 
causal factors for 20% of weather-related accidents and 23% of those accidents resulted in 
fatalities (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). In particular, carburetor icing and high density altitude were 
the most cited of the temperature, humidity, and pressure weather condition factors. High density 
altitude was associated with 42% of weather-related accidents, whereas, Carburetor icing 
contributed to 34% (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However, while these subcategories attributed to a 
remarkable proportion of temperature, humidity, and pressure weather-related accidents, again, 
fatality rates were relatively low. During the 30-year analysis, carburetor icing was identified as 
a contributing factor for only 79 fatal weather-related accidents and high density contributing 
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factor altitude (changes in altitude/pressure, temperature, and humidity that effect engine and 
aerodynamic performance of the aircraft) for 297 out of 1,268 high density altitude questions 
(Fultz & Ashley, 2016).  Within this category of temperature, humidity, and pressure weather 
condition factors, structural icing attributed to 50% of weather-related accidents and only 8% of 
fatal accidents across all categories (Fultz & Ashley, 2016).  
Another area of review has been turbulence and convective weather.  Fultz & Ashley (2016) 
cited turbulence and convective weather as a contributing factor for 8% of all weather-related 
accidents in their period of review. Despite the overall low contributing factor rate, Turbulence 
and convective weather condition factors have a high fatality rate. In fact, 65% of all the 
turbulence and convective weather-related accidents resulted in at least one fatality. General 
turbulence and thunderstorms were associated with the majority of turbulence and convective 
fatal accidents (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). Capobianco & Lee (2001) theorized the reasoning for the 
low turbulence and thunderstorm accident rate and high fatality rate may be a result of pilots’ 
awareness of the negative impact these conditions have on flight performance. Therefore, pilots 
may tend to avoid thunderstorms (Capobianco & Lee, 2001) but, when these hazards are 
encountered, these flights often end in fatalities.  
Ceiling, visibility, and precipitation is another area of concern. This weather condition 
category is associated with 27% of weather-related accidents and are affiliated with 71% GA 
weather-related fatalities (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). Low ceilings/cloud layers and fog were the 
most cited weather phenomena within the ceiling, visibility, and precipitation contributing 
factors category. Specifically, low ceilings/cloud layers accounted for 57% of ceiling, visibility, 
and precipitation weather-related fatal accidents, while, fog contributed to 40% of ceiling, 
visibility, and precipitation weather-related accidents and fatal accidents.  
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Weather conditions associated with the ceiling, visibility, and precipitation condition 
category are weather phenomena that largely constitute instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC). The FAA General Operating Flight rules (FAA 14 CFR) define IMC as weather 
conditions below the weather minimums required for flight within visual flight rules. The CFR 
requires pilots to fly in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) when flying in IMC. The 
majority of weather-related accidents described in this ceiling, visibility, and precipitation 
weather condition category were Visual Flight Rules flight operations in IMC. Capobianco & 
Lee (2001) also claim that VFR into IMC was often associated with pilot error, pilots flying 
close to VFR minimums and becoming immersed in IMC. 
 It is also interesting to consider how weather accident rates have changed over time. 
Although some reports indicate decreases in weather accidents, others show increases or no-
change. This is particularly true regarding fatal accidents. Overall, results indicate the proportion 
of wind related accidents have increased from 44%  of all GA weather-related accidents in 1982 
to 60% in 2013 (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). In contrast, turbulence related accidents have shown 
small decreases in accident rate during the study time period. Similarly, ceiling, visibility, and 
precipitation GA weather-related accidents have decreased from 30% to 15% over the course of 
the observed time period (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However, despite the improvement with a 
decrease in percentage of ceiling, visibility, and precipitation related accidents, this weather 
condition category still accounted for 60% of GA weather-related fatalities during the study 
period. In fact, Fultz & Ashley (2016) argue that the decrease in GA weather-related accidents 
may be due to a general decrease in GA operations as a whole, rather than, improved pilot 
understanding of weather and hazardous weather.  
 18 
VFR to IMC  
 
Thus, VFR into IMC is markedly one of the most dangerous of all GA weather-related 
accidents (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). As a result, research has been aimed 
toward determining the primary contributing factors for GA weather-related accidents, 
specifically, VFR into IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). Previous research suggests inadequate 
preflight planning, poor decision-making, poor situational awareness, inadequate risk 
assessment, and technology may play a key role in pilots flying VFR unintentionally into IMC 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2005). Because of the danger inherent to VFR to IMC, 
the current research will focus on that weather phenomenon.  
Pilot Qualifications 
 
Research has shown that private pilots have incurred the majority of fatal accidents (Nall, 
2008). Specifically, 773 GA weather-related accidents that occurred between 2003 and 2007 
featured Private Pilot as the Pilot in Command (PIC), while 460 PIC held a Commercial 
certificate, and 179 held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate (ATP) (FAA, 2010). Goh & 
Wiegmann (2001) conducted a specific analysis on VFR into IMC accidents from 1990 until 
1997. Their results were similar to the results found in Fultz & Ashley (2016), the majority of 
pilots who encountered adverse weather inadvertently held a pilot certificate or less without an 
instrument rating. Additionally, Goh & Wiegmann (2001) found that the majority of the VFR 
into IMC accidents were encountered inadvertently. They suggest these pilots may be less 
experienced interpreting weather, resulting in poor situation evaluation and poor decision-
making.   
In summary, non-fatal GA weather-related accident rate seems to be declining. However, the 
GA weather-related fatal accident rate is slowly decreasing (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; FAA, 
 19 
2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016; Nall, 2019; Wiegmann et al., 2005). Further investigation has 
highlighted VFR into IMC, specifically ceiling and visibility, as one of the most dangerous and 
frequently occurring GA weather-related fatal accidents. (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & 
Ashley, 2016). The pilots who encounter a VFR to IMC situation are usually Private pilots 
without instrument certification.   
To comprehensively address the issue of VFR into IMC accidents, it is imperative for 
researchers to thoroughly understand the causal factors behind VFR into IMC accidents. The 
next section will first describe weather sources and products available for pilots to use to avoid 
VFR into IMC.   
Weather Sources and Products 
 
Weather sources can have a prominent effect on a pilots’ preflight planning and inflight 
abilities (Parson et al., 2005). Therefore, it is important for pilots to select proper weather 
sources. There are three primary FAA approved sources for preflight weather information: 
Aviation Weather Center, and Leidos 1-800wxbrief. These sources offer a variety of weather 
products used to report weather phenomena. As shown in Table 1, there are three categories of 
weather products, Analysis, Forecasts, and Observations (FAA, 2016).   
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Table 1. 
Weather Products Descriptions 
 
 Category Product Name Presentation Description Inflight 
Metar
Graphical 
and Textual
This product reports current 
weather at an airport at the time of 
observation , including: Wind, 
Visibility, Runway Visual Range 
(RVR), Present Weather 
Phenomena, Sky Conditions, 
Temperature, Dewpoint, and 
Altimeter Setting.
Yes
Pilot Weather 
Report
Graphical 
and Textual
This product is a self reporting 
summary of weather phenomena 
in an area.
Yes
Radar Graphical
This product reports insentity of 
precipitation occuring in a certain 
area.
Yes
Satellite Graphical
Satellite products report 
temperature and sunlight reflected 
from the earth's surface and 
clouds. With this information, 
pilots can infer cloud position and 
height.
No
Surface Analysis Graphical
This weather product reports 
pressure systems and front types.
No
Ceiling and Visibility 
Analysis
Graphical
This weather product Reports real-
time weather conditions such as,  
Flight Category, Ceiling, and 
Visbilitiy.
Yes
Sigmet (convective 
and non 
convectice)
Graphical
This weather product reports 
Severe Turbulence, Icing, 
Widespread Thunderstoms, 
Duststorms, Sand Storms, and 
Volcanic Ash.
No
Graphical Airmet
Graphical 
and Textual
This product reports forecasted 
weather conditions, including: IFR, 
Ceiling, Visbility, Icing, Freezing 
Level, and Turbulence at specific 
times.
No
Terminal Area 
Forceast
Textual
This product is a concise forecast 
of weather wihtin 5 staute miles of 
airport for a specific time.
No
Winds Aloft Textual
This product provides a forecast of 
temperature, wind direction, and 
speed at certain times.
No
Freezing Level 
Chart
Graphical Reports lowest freezing level 
heights
No
Surface Prognostic 
chart
Graphical
This product provides a forecast of 
precipitation, presure systems, 
and fronts.
No
Low level 
Significant Weather 
Chart
Graphical
This product reports flight 
categories, freezing levels, and 
turbulence.
No
CIP/FIP Graphical
This forecast reports icing 
location, severity, and probability.
No
Fo
re
ca
st
A
na
ly
si
s
O
bs
er
va
tio
n
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First, analysis products are augmented representations of observed weather information or 
presentation of an atmospheric phenomena (temperature and ceiling height). Most analyses 
present automated information (FAA, 2016), which is information that has been gathered and 
synthesized using automation with no human meteorologist personnel involved in the process.  
The surface analysis chart and the Ceiling and Visibility Analysis (CVA) are two analysis 
products (see Table 1). The surface analysis is a graphical product that displays fronts and 
surface pressure information, while CVA is a graphical product that reports ceiling and visibility 
information as well as flight categories. Analysis products are crucial for preflight weather 
planning; they provide the user with current regional and national weather conditions. This 
information helps pilots understand current weather conditions. 
Observation products present raw information obtained from weather sensors, examples of 
observation information include, METAR and Radar. METAR reports weather information at a 
specific airport and Radar reports precipitation activity (FAA, 2016). Both Observation and 
analysis products are crucial for preflight weather planning; they provide the user with current 
specific, regional, and national weather conditions (see Table 1).  
Forecasts are predictions of how weather phenomena will develop. Examples include 
Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF) and significant meteorological information (SIGMET) 
charts. TAFs provide a summary of forecasted weather conditions for a specific area (FAA, 
2016). SIGMETs are graphical products that provide forecasted hazardous weather information 
(FAA, 2016). Forecasted products help pilots perceive weather trends and plan for developing 
weather conditions along their route (see Table 1). 
However, even with all of the weather products available, pilots are still having difficulty 
with preflight and inflight weather avoidance (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). This could be due to the 
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cognitive complexities associated with understanding aviation weather and performing preflight 
and inflight cognitive tasks. However, before describing the preflight and inflight tasks, it is 
important to review the human information processing model. 
Human Information Processing  
 
Cognitive Tasks are assessed through investigating how operators process information and 
select and execute actions. As shown in Figure 2, one of the most researched models for 
understanding human cognitive process is the Human Information Processing Model (Wickens, 
Gordon, Liu, & Lee, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 2. Human Information Processing Model 
The human information processing model is organized into three main components, encoding 
sensory information, central processing of information, and response selection. During the 
encoding sensory stage, stimuli input is sensed by the operator through visual, auditory, haptic, or 
olfactory sensor receptors (see Figure 2). Once the information is registered, the information is 
perceived, in other words, the received raw sensation is given meaning. For example, when pilots 
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receive taxi instructions from ATC, this information is sensed by the operators’ ears as sound 
waves and then perceived by the brain as taxi instructions.  
Then this information is stored in the person’s short term memory. Usually, unless rehearsed, 
short term memory can only hold seven to nine chunks of information before information is lost. 
However, if this information is processed and stored in long term memory the information will 
be accessible much longer and the total long term memory capacity is vast. The brain uses 
information stored in short/working memory and long term memory to select and execute 
responses. For example, in the case of the previous ATC taxi scenario, once the taxi instructions 
are stored in working memory, the brain recalls information from long term memory such as a 
mental model of the airport diagram and taxiways. The recalled information assists pilots when 
executing directions and deciding whether to turn right or left. Then, once the decision is made, 
the operator relies on information from long term memory on piloting and taxi skills to help 
execute the action. Using the information processing model, researchers can complete a task 
analysis and identify possible limitations, and hazards for users and in turn, develop solutions.  
This next section reviews the weather preflight planning process to identify components that 
may cause limitations and errors. 
Preflight Planning 
 
Preflight weather planning is crucial to safe GA operations. Although pilots access weather 
while in-flight, most of weather product interpretation and planning occurs during the preflight 
phase. During preflight planning, pilots use aviation weather knowledge and skills to interpret 
weather information concerning their flight route. The FAA divides the preflight weather 
planning process into three main components: Perceive, Process, Perform (Parson et al., 2005). 
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Beginning with the “perceiving” phase, pilots are gathering information to conceptualize 
meteorological conditions along their route (Parson et al., 2005). Information acquisition is a 
crucial component of the preflight process. If incomplete or in error,  pilots may not receive vital 
information (see Table 2). When completing the preflight process, pilots first identify their route 
and landmarks on their aeronautical sectional chart (Parson et al., 2005). Next, pilots review the 
weather along their route by accessing various weather products (Parson et al., 2005). This is 
described as the information acquisition step. However, there are numerous factors that can 
hinder this process.  
When gathering information, it is imperative pilots select the appropriate weather sources. 
Although there are various weather sources available for pilots, pilots should consider the 
various weather source vendors (e.g. Aviation Weather Center (AWC), 1-800 Weather Brief), 
how the information is produced (Lanicci et al., 2012), and limiting factors (Blickensderfer et al., 
2015). All these factors such can dramatically impact the quality of weather information 
provided and stored in the working memory.  
In the gathering information and perceiving stage, a number of challenges may arise.   
First, pilots may have difficulty accessing certain products due to the usability of the weather 
source (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; Defilippis et al., 2018). 
Table 2.  
Preflight Task Analysis 
Steps  Tasks Tools Knowledge Skills Limitations 
Pe
rc
ei
ve
 
Decide which 
product to access N/A 
Knowledge of 
product report 
information 
N/A 
Failure to access 
essential products 
Knowledge of  
product 
limitations 
Failure to select correct 
weather products for 
retrieving information on 
various weather 
phenomena 
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Knowledge of 
product issuance 
times 
  
Find desired 
product 
Weather 
sources: AWC, 
Duats, 18000 
wx brief, 
Foreflight 
Knowledge of 
product 
limitations 
Ability to 
navigate the 
AWC website 
Failure to collect all 
appropriate products by 
excluding region 
information 
Knowledge of 
product issuance 
times 
Failure to collect time 
valid products 
Failure to collect correct 
weather information  
            
Pr
oc
es
s 
Interpret the 
accessed product 
The accessed 
weather product 
Knowledge of 
interpretation 
criteria specific to 
each  product 
N/A 
Failure to accurately 
interpret product 
information 
Knowledge of 
how to interpret 
each  product 
Knowledge of 
product legend 
Knowledge of 
aviation weather 
principles related 
to reported 
weather 
phenomena 
Knowledge of 
Product 
limitations 
            
Pe
rfo
rm
 Apply 
information to 
aeronautical 
preflight 
planning 
Departure and 
destination 
airports 
Knowledge of 
how weather 
affects aircraft 
performance and 
flight category 
conditions 
Ability to apply 
weather 
information 
Failure to consider 
weather information 
when making flight 
planning decisions 
Aeronautical 
and weather 
information 
 
For example, if a pilot wants to access infrared satellite images using AWC, the pilot may not 
be able to find the weather product due to poor website design. On the AWC website, to access 
the satellite products, pilots have to discern whether satellite images are categorized as a forecast, 
observation, or an advisory product. After selecting the satellite image type option, users then 
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need to know which geographical region they need a report for and which type of satellite image 
would provide them with the information needed. This process can be very cognitively taxing 
and complicated for a novice pilot to navigate on their own, pilots may not be able to recall this 
information easily from their long term memory (see Table 2).  
Additionally, pilots may be unfamiliar with product limitations and may access inappropriate 
products for information regarding certain weather phenomena (Lanicci et al., 2012). For 
example, if a pilot wants to evaluate cloud coverage along their flight route, and they access 
radar believing they will receive information on cloud location and movement, the information 
they receive would be misleading. For example, radar only reports precipitation, not cloud 
information. Also, since the product is new to the user, the pilot will have to rely more on their 
working memory.  
Another challenge is simply remembering to access all applicable weather products that 
would inform them of the conditions for their flight. Checking multiple products is necessary to 
get a robust understanding of the weather (Vincent et al., 2013). Depending on the weather 
source accessed, while the weather products are available, no guide exists for the pilots 
prompting them on what products to examine for their preflight plan. For less experienced pilots, 
this may result in incomplete review of products as pilots may simply forget to access certain 
weather products with valuable information. This could be a result of too much information 
being stored in the working memory, which can lead to mistakes and erroneous performance. 
 After accessing the weather products/information, pilots need to analyze the information 
received, this is referred to as the “process stage” (Parson et al., 2005). During this stage, 
aviation weather principles are used to interpret weather products (e.g. Table 2). Again, product 
usability can serve as a barrier between pilots and needed weather information (Latorella & 
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Chamberlain, 2002). For instance, certain weather products do not feature legends or their 
legends do not feature all the symbols present on the weather product (e.g. Aviation Forecast). 
With the multitude of weather products available, it is unlikely that pilots have what each symbol 
and abbreviation represents for every weather product in their long term memory. Additionally, 
some weather products may display a legend; however, the legend itself may be unclear 
regarding the weather phenomena being reported in the product. For example, consider infrared 
satellite imagery, the legend presents the various colors used in the product and informs the user 
the different colors are associated with different temperatures (FAA, 2016). However, the 
product does not show any information informing the user that the light colors and cooler 
temperature are used to imply higher altitude clouds, whereas the darker colors imply lower 
altitudes. The legend assumes that the user (in this case pilots) possess a high level of knowledge 
of these concepts.  Unfortunately, assumptions such as this can make product interpretation a 
challenging task for novice pilots. 
The next step in the preflight planning process, “Perform” requires pilots to make decisions 
based on their evaluation of the weather reports (Parson et al., 2005). However, a lack of 
capability to interpret weather products combined with a lack aviation weather knowledge could 
limit the effectiveness of pilots’ weather-related decision-making (Blickensderfer et al., 2015).  It 
is possible that, due to a poor knowledge of aviation weather principles, pilots may be incapable 
of linking weather reports to certain weather phenomena. For example, the Surface analysis chart 
displays a legend clearly decoding all the symbols used on the product. However, If the user does 
not understand what weather phenomena is associated with high and low pressures, cold/ war 
fronts, isobars, the product is rendered useless. This is concerning considering that pilots use 
weather information to decide what aspects of their flight route need alteration due to weather 
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conditions. Pilots need a grounded understanding of aviation weather fundamentals in their long 
term memory to understand the weather phenomena being reported and how it will affect their 
inflight performance. For instance, if weather products report low ceiling and poor visibility, 
pilots then would have to predict how that weather will develop and when and how it will affect 
their flight path. Applying weather information to flight operations is crucial for deciding 
alternate airports and diversion plans in case of emergencies. However, planning for future 
events can be difficult if pilots have limited aviation weather knowledge.  In other words, even if 
weather products have high degrees of usability (e.g., legends clearly identifying the various 
symbols and abbreviations etc.), pilots may still have difficulty applying these products due to a 
lack of understanding of how weather phenomena impact in-flight performance. Without a solid 
foundation of basic weather principles in the long term memory, and weather condition 
information gathered in the working memory, users may have limited experience and knowledge 
to recall to assist with the current challenges of applying gained knowledge from the preflight 
process to the context of their flight route. 
Preflight preparation is crucial to safe flight activity (Parson et al., 2005). However, each 
step of the preflight process requires pilots to have knowledge of aviation products and weather 
knowledge. Without an adequate understanding, pilots will be unable to acquire, interpret, and 
apply weather information. In turn, this could lead to a poorly developed mental model of 
weather conditions while in flight, which, in turn can have significant negative effects on pilot 
inflight decisions. While inflight, pilots should refer to preflight weather notes and monitor 
developing weather by contacting inflight weather sources such as HIWAS, and ASOS. 
However, without a firm understanding of how weather affects flight performance (long term 
memory) and a weather plan (working memory), pilots may not be equipped to mitigate 
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hazardous event while in flight (Lanicci et al., 2012). Therefore, it is imperative to understand 
and mitigate poor aviation knowledge and skills and to understand products and limitations. 
Decision Making 
 
Decision-making skills and judgment assessments are essential for weather avoidance and 
hazardous weather encounter recovery (FAA, 2017).  However, humans suffer from various 
cognitive biases that may hinder logical decision-making (NTSB, 2005). As a result, decision-
making errors are prevalent and may be exacerbated depending on information available, 
environmental factors, and physiological factors (NTSB, 2005). 
For example, “pilot continuation” is a decision error where pilots continue flight activity 
into degrading weather conditions, seemingly ignoring the evidence indicating unsafe flight 
conditions (NTSB, 2005). This can occur during a  VFR into IMC incident,  as pilots experience 
IMC and fail to divert to an alternate airport, change flight route, or return toward a departure 
airport (NTSB, 2005). It may appear that pilots who find themselves in “VFR into IMC” 
situations have high risk tolerance, when in actuality there are a variety of factors impacting a 
pilot’s decision to continue into degrading weather (NTSB, 2005). For instance, it is possible that 
some pilots continue into IMC due to an inadequate assessment of the current weather situation. 
Therefore, pilots’ poor judgement may not be a direct effect of the propensity for risk taking; 
instead, it may be rooted in a misunderstanding of weather and its effects on flight. 
“Prospect theory” describes another cognitive bias that can affect weather-related decision-
making. Prospect theory explains how framing courses of action as either a “gain” or “loss” can 
have an effect on participant decision selection (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Goh & Wiegmann 
(2001) explained how prospect theory can affect weather-related decision-making in VFR into 
IMC incidents. They argued that many pilots associate diverting from their flight route due to 
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hazardous weather as a loss and that, in turn, this may encourage pilots to continue flight into 
degrading weather (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). In contrast, if pilots frame diverting as a gain (i.e., 
the gain being that they will remain safe and without injury), then pilots may be more likely to 
divert when facing IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). O’Hare & Smitheram (1995) also 
investigated the decision framing effects on decision-making during VFR into IMC accidents. 
Results indicated that pilots who framed VFR into IMC operations as losses and safe diverting as 
gains, were less likely to continue flight into degrading weather. 
Experience and Aviation Weather Skill Acquisition. While decision-making biases may be a 
contributing factor for VFR into IMC, decision errors may also stem from poor aviation weather 
knowledge or skill. As aforementioned, most weather accidents occur with less experienced 
private pilots (FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2006). GA weather-related accident data identified 
low experience, non-instrument rated pilots as the major demographic for VFR into IMC 
operations (National Transportation Safety Board, 2005) and that operational weather experience 
is related to weather decision-making abilities and skill acquisition (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2005).  
Research in skill acquisition and cognitive psychology describes the skill acquisition 
process as novice operators progress to intermediate and expert proficiency levels (Anderson, 
1993; Patel & Groen, 1991: Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Research demonstrates that skill 
acquisition is built through the collection of multiple experiences and cases stored in long term 
memory (Anderson, 1993). These cases and examples are then recalled and acclimated to assist 
with the challenge at hand (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Operators/pilots at varying levels of 
expertise and skill acquisition (novices, intermediate, or experts) operate differently.  Novices 
will often function less precisely and skillfully than intermediates, and intermediates less than 
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experts (Wiggins, Stevens, Howard, Henley, & O’Hare, 2002).  Novices’ poor performance is 
due to the undeveloped knowledge and skills required to complete tasks comprehensively (Patel 
& Groen, 1991: Wiggins & O'Hare, 1995). Prior research suggests that, as task difficulty 
increases, the difference between expert and novice information acquisition methods will widen 
(Woods, 1988). Thus, these differences in skill acquisition may be more prevalent in aviation 
and preflight planning, due to the task difficulty, high stake risks, and ambiguous weather-related 
information. It is likely that differences in weather-related knowledge and skills is one reason the 
private pilots are getting into trouble. Interestingly, however, when investigating differences in 
pilot expertise, research suggests that intermediate pilots may be more at risk for unsafe flight 
activity (Wiggins, Stevens, Howard, Henley, & O’Hare, 2002). Intermediate pilots are in a 
particular position in which they may be more prone to decision-making errors (O’Hare, 
Wiggins, Batts, Morrison, 1994). Unlike novice pilots, intermediate pilots may not be receiving 
training. However, unlike experts, intermediate pilots may have not cultivated the necessary skill 
to make safe decisions (Wiggins et al., 2002). O'Hare, et al., (1994) investigated accident data 
and revealed, intermediate pilots incurred “goal formation errors” (e.g., Did the pilot choose a 
goal which was feasible?, Is a missed approach feasible considering the current situation?) more 
than procedural errors (e.g., Did the pilot execute procedures consistent with the selected 
strategy?, Did the pilot complete all the procedural steps required to perform a missed 
approach?) and action errors (e.g., Was the procedure executed as planned?, Was the pilot able to 
complete this missed approach successfully?). Furthermore, goal formation errors were more 
prevalent among accidents resulting in serious injuries and fatalities (O'Hare, et al., 1994). 
The intermediate level of skill acquisition is analogous to the competent stage (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986), knowledge compilation stage (Anderson, 1983), rule stage (Rasmussen, 1983), 
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or the associative stage (Fitts & Posner, 1967).  All of these stages present an intermediate stage 
of skill acquisition during which the person is heavily reliant on quantitative processes rather 
than qualitative task specific processing (Wiggins et al., 2002). Intermediate operators have not 
fully established efficient expert level qualitative information processing which is necessary to 
process task related information and implement action effectively (Bell, 1997). This trend may 
also be prevalent amongst GA pilots. GA weather-related accident data trends suggest GA 
Private pilots account for the majority of weather-related and VFR into IMC accidents (Goh & 
Wiegmann, 2002; FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). This could be due to private pilots’ 
inability to process weather information and apply it to their flight effectively.  
Previous research has investigated expertise with respect to the aviation weather task of 
Preflight planning. Expertise and aviation weather knowledge can have direct implication on 
preflight planning for inflight performance. Preflight planning is a complex task as the pilot must 
integrate aeronautical information and weather information from various sources (Wiggins et al., 
2002). Wiggins et al., (2002) employed process tracing to analyze how novice, intermediate and 
expert pilots accessed information for preflight planning. Process tracing allows researchers to 
investigate operators’ problem solving based on the order of information acquisition while 
completing a task (Svenson, 1979). Process tracing can provide insight into how novice, 
intermediate, and expert pilots access information and make decisions during the preflight 
process. Wiggins et al., (2002) results indicated that there were differences in information 
acquisition efficiency between the three groups. Specifically, experts were able to identify 
necessary information and integrate that information more effectively than intermediate pilots 
(Wiggins et al., 2002). 
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 These results suggest that intermediate and novice pilots may have difficulty during the 
preflight process due to their inability to access, interpret and apply weather information. Novice 
and intermediate pilots may have challenges with the preflight process due to a lack of aviation 
weather knowledge and poor understanding of product limitations (Blickensderfer et al., 2017).  
Blickensderfer et al. (2017) and Burian & Jordan (2002) used written examinations to assess 
pilots’ knowledge and skill regarding aviation weather. The evaluations included weather 
patterns, weather hazards, weather services, weather regulations, weather product interpretation, 
and weather-related decision-making.  Both studies demonstrated that participants had a low 
aviation weather knowledge, and in particular that pilots had difficulty answering weather 
interpretation questions compared to weather principles and decision-making questions. Results 
also revealed that formal aviation weather training alone increased aviation weather knowledge, 
but flight experience alone did not necessarily increase weather knowledge.  
Summary. In summary, research demonstrate most weather accidents occur for private pilots 
without instrument (FAA, 2010).  Additional research shows that expert pilots access weather 
information differently from novice and intermediate pilots (Wiggins, 2014). Still other research 
shows that pilots struggle to answer written questions about aviation weather and weather 
product interpretation (Blickensderfer et. al, 2017).  All of this can be leaving novice and 
intermediate level pilots without the information they need to form adequate situation awareness 
of the weather for their flights. In turn, poor situational awareness and cue association has been 
highly linked to low experience and could have implications for GA flight operations. 
Situational Awareness  
 
 Previous research also identifies situational awareness as a contributing factor for the 
stagnant GA weather-related accident rate and VFR into IMC accidents (National Transportation 
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Safety Board, 2005). Researchers suggest that pilots encounter VFR into IMC inadvertently and 
may not be able to recognize the cues of IMC forming in their flight path.  Situation assessment 
research claims this inaccurate assessment of weather development may be related to poor 
feature association formation in novice pilots (Ellis, 1996).  This section briefly reviews 
Situation Awareness function in GA hazardous weather-related accidents.  
SA and experience may be a key factor in the assessment of weather phenomena 
interpretation and recognition of deteriorating weather (Wiggins, 2014). Long-term memory and 
cue utilization can help fill gaps of information from inadequate attention and working memory 
(Wiggins, 2014). Therefore, if pilots lack knowledge of aviation weather principles, it could 
hinder their abilities to use cue utilization and long-term memory to assess their situation. 
Research has revealed differences between expert and novice weather phenomena feature 
recognition (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Which in turn, can determine the quality of weather 
phenomena assessment while inflight.  
When features in the operator’s external environment are related to internal knowledge from 
past experiences, the resulting construct is a “cue”. Research suggests that these cues are used to 
help direct human behavior and build mental models (Rosen et al., 2010; Wiggins, 2006, 2012; 
Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003a). The strength of the relationship between cues can determine 
whether pilots are able to perform efficient weather phenomena assessment (Wiggins, 2014). 
These claims are consistent with the Endsley (1995) interpretation of situational awareness and 
situation assessment, where operators take information from their external environment and 
make connections with internal knowledge and behavior to predict the future state of the system 
(Klein, 2008). The initial analysis of the current environment is termed situational assessment, 
whereas, using that information to predict the future is prospective diagnosis (Uhlarik & 
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Comerforf, 2002). The operators’ ability to perform accurate situation assessment and 
prospective diagnosis is contingent on the operator’s development of feature-event relationships 
(Wiggins, 2014). Research suggests, strong feature-event relationships are built through 
exposure to the operational environment. Frequent exposure to the system or environment will 
clarify feature-event associations, enabling the more experience pilots to respond to events more 
accurately than those less experienced (Wiggins, 2014). This could provide insight into the high 
GA Weather accident rate amongst low experienced pilots. Low experienced private pilots, due 
to a lack of exposure, may not have strong cue association while inflight to assist with situation 
assessment and weather avoidance.  
Aviation Weather Situation Assessment Measures. Measuring diagnostic skills and situation 
assessment is a challenge for general aviation weather research. Although research has been 
invested into expertise and novice research, most of the expertise classifications have been a 
priori by hours of experience performing a task. However, this method of assigning expertise is 
based on length of experience, rather than, of quality of experience (Hoffman et al.,1995; O’Hare 
et al.,1998). Wiggins (2014) claims diagnostic expertise is determined based on the development 
of feature event associations and performance, rather than the operators’ amount of flight hours. 
While it is difficult to determine an accurate response in operational environments, researchers 
propose measuring diagnostic skills with response latency (Wiggins, 2016). However, response 
latency may be a difficult measure to use in the context of weather. For instance, if the task 
requires pilots to predict weather development and avoid deteriorating weather, how can one be 
sure weather will develop into hazardous conditions without the pilot encountering the weather? 
Wiggins (2014) employs this approach in most of his studies by investigating information 
acquisition as a possible measure for diagnostic skills. This approach allows for evaluation of 
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accuracy, behavior, and cue feature relationship (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995; Wiggins, 2006, 
2012). By capturing the selection and sequence of information acquisition, researchers are able 
to understand the cues operators perceive as crucial for problem mitigation (Wiggins, 2014). 
Moreover, operators’ information selection could depict expertise. This is especially informative 
when assessing pilots’ decision-making in the preflight phase, where weather information is 
acquired and flight route decisions are determined (Wiggins, 2014). The decisions made in 
preflight could prevent VFR into IMC, and instead ensure safe flight operations. 
Wiggins, Azar, & Loveday, (2012) investigated whether there is an association between 
weather-related task-specific cue utilization and decision-making. Participants completed a 
feature association task and a feature discrimination task, response and variance of responses 
were measured for both tasks (Wiggins et al., 2012).  The cue utilization responses were 
compared to demographics and participants’ performance on a weather preflight scenario 
(Wiggins et al., 2012). Results from both cue assessments revealed that experts were more 
definitive in their responses resulting in more variance in their answers compared to non-experts. 
Preflight and cue assessment results were fairly consistent; however, responses did not correlate 
with flight hours and certification. Wiggins et al. (2012) claims, these results may be a predictor 
of pilot preflight performance. 
Wiggins, Azar, Hawken, Loveday, & Newman (2014) conducted another study to gain better 
understanding of experts’ and non-experts cue and feature association when encountering 
deteriorating weather conditions near their flight destination. Pilots received Expert Intensive 
Skills Evaluation (EXPERTise) Situational Judgement Test (SJT), based on their composite 
scores participants were organized into two categories. The assessment consisted of a feature 
identification task, a feature association task, and a transition task (Wiggins et al., 2014). After 
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being sorted into the two groups participants were required to review flight plan and weather, to 
determine whether to undertake the simulated flight scenario (Wiggins et al., 2014). Then a 
subset of the two groups were chosen to fly the in fight simulation. Weather in the scenario was 
VR into IMC, the weather deteriorated close to the flight destination (Wiggins et al., 2014). 
Results indicated participants in the less experienced cue utilization group decided not to embark 
on the flight due to a lack of information. Where, the more experienced cue utilization group 
were more likely to embark on the flight and fly into degrading weather conditions. However, 
once again these results did not correlate with flight hours, risk perceptions or pilot certification 
(Wiggins et al., 2014).  
The lack of correlation between flight experience/pilot certification and aviation weather cue 
utilization and decision-making could be related to the poor measures for aviation weather 
situation and cue association assessment or it could support the suggestion that the traditional 
means of aviation experience (flight hours and pilot certification) do not predict aviation weather 
knowledge and skills. Instead maybe weather training or other factors should be considered when 
predicting aviation weather knowledge and skills. 
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Aviation Weather Cue-Based Training. Wiggins & O’Hare (2003) developed “weather-
wise”, a cue-based training program to help pilots form stronger feature associations. Chansik 
(2011) conducted a study to investigate how weather recognition training effects GA pilots’ 
situation assessment in deteriorating weather.  After taking the course, pilots were assessed on 
their ability to perceive changing weather conditions, risk perception, risk tolerance, and decision 
accuracy (Chansik, 2011). Results indicated, the group that received the weather wise training 
displayed significantly higher ceiling estimation and decision accuracy performance, however 
there was no significant difference between groups on risk tolerance, risk assessment and 
decision confidence Chansik, 2011).These results could support the notion weather training is 
helpful to improve pilots’ aviation weather knowledge.  
Summary. In summary, research has identified SA as a crucial component for the GA 
weather-related accidents. Specifically, previous studies have evaluated pilots SA during pre-
flight and simulated inflight within developing weather (Chansik, 2011; Wiggins et al., 2014; 
Wiggins et al., 2012).  Despite the various attempts to train and measure experience and weather 
SA, the new proposed measurements have yet to correlate with traditional expertise 
measurements (i.e. flight hours, pilot certification, etc.). This could support the claim that 
traditional pilot expertise measures may be accurate for flight performance; however, they may 
not be indicative of pilots’ aviation weather knowledge and weather SA. Additionally, with 
mostly a priori weather SA assessments, there are limited measures available to validate new 
aviation weather SA measures. Furthermore, the limited measures available for both aviation 
weather knowledge and situation assessment provide is little explanation as to why low 
experienced pilots account for the majority of aviation weather-related accidents. However, risk 
has been identified as a contributing factor to GA weather-related accidents. Therefore, it is 
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imperative to investigate how risk and poor pilot judgement relate to GA low experience pilots 
and weather-related accidents. 
Risk Assessment  
 
 Risk assessment has been linked to poor pilot judgment of GA scenarios, which may lead to 
possible weather avoidance errors (O’Hare 1990).  Most of the aviation risk related literature 
address operators’ behavior in risky situations by considering risk from two different, yet 
associated concepts: perception and tolerance. 
Risk perception and Risk Tolerance. Risk perception is defined as the ability to identify and 
evaluate risk associated with hazardous events (Hunter, 2002). Brown & Groeger (1988) theorize 
that risk perception is comprised of information gathered from the environmental hazards and the 
operator’s abilities. For example, less experienced operators may not have the ability to 
efficiently assess hazards and risks. In other words, if pilots lack a developed understanding of 
how weather develops and effects flight, it may hinder accurate and effective risk perception 
(Hunter, 2002).  Consider VFR into IMC.  Less experienced pilots may not pick up on cues in 
the environment that indicate hazardous weather is developing.  To effectively assess risks, 
operators need to be able to appropriately perceive external situations (Hunter, 2002). Improper 
evaluation of the weather situation may result in an underrated understanding of the hazards 
involved in the situation and may result in an over-estimated confidence in individual skills to 
navigate the situation (Hunter, 2002). Overestimation of personal pilot skills has been cited as a 
contributor to VFR into IMC accidents, but again, this may be a result of a misperception of the 
risks associated with aviation weather.  
Risk tolerance is more difficult to define, as risk tolerance is reliant on personal 
characteristics and internal factors (Hunter, 2002). Previous research suggests that risk tolerance 
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can be mediated by the value affiliated with the goal or task, and risk tolerance may change 
depending on the situation. For instance, the same individual may have low risk tolerance when 
taking a trip to the grocery store to pick up an item that they could buy another time and the same 
person may exhibit a high risk tolerance when evacuating due to an impending severe storm. 
(Hunter, 2002).   
With respect to aviation weather, if pilots misinterpret cues, they may not have accurate risk 
perception. As a result, a lack of aviation weather knowledge, and poor cue feature association 
may have an influence on pilots’ risk tolerance. Knecht (2008) claims that experience in certain 
weather phenomena can influence subsequent pilot decision-making and how they use weather-
related information. Operators need to be able to identify weather risks and mitigate the situation 
(Ferraro, Vandyke, Zander, Anderson, & Kuehlen, 2015).  
Hunter (2002) investigated whether risk perception and risk tolerance have separate effects 
on pilot decision-making. Results indicated that there was a negative relationship between pilot 
risk perception and risk tolerance (i.e., as risk perception increased, risk tolerance decreased). 
Therefore, pilots who are not sensitive perceivers of risk in hazardous weather, may also have a 
tendency to take higher risks in other tasks and situations. In congruence with the principles of 
the zero risk theory, a higher level of risk was associated with a lower perception of risk. 
However, student pilots also displayed low level of perceived risk. Hunter (2002) explains 
student pilots may be too novice to accurately assess risk. Previous research suggests that risk 
perception matures as the operator gains more experience with their task and their environment 
(Jensen et al.’s 1997; Wiggins and O’Hare’s 2003). Risk has previously been measured through 
pilots rating risks in simulated flight scenarios (e.g., Hunter, 2002; O’Hare, 1990). This measure, 
however, did not account for the accuracy of the risk appraisal. Researchers claim it is difficult 
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to determine the correct level of risk perception, as often there is no definite “correct” perception 
of risk (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). Different pilots apply different factors to decision-making, 
this can make the decision-making process very dynamic and difficult to predict (Knecht, Harris, 
& Shappell, 2004).  
Finally, Ferraro, Vandyke, Zander, Anderson, & Kuehlen (2015) compared risk assessment 
ratings of weather by non-aviation experienced students to aviation experienced students. Results 
revealed that aviation experienced participants rated weather-related scenarios as riskier than 
non-aviation experienced participants. However, the pilots’ overall risk perception declined with 
more flight and simulated flight hours, which may suggest that  risk perception should be 
continuously trained (Ferraro et al., 2015). 
Summary. In summary, previous research has associated poor risk perception and risk 
tolerance with low experience pilots. If low experienced pilots have poor knowledge of aviation 
principles it could hinder their ability to understand the risks associated with weather conditions 
and their effect on aircraft performance. When pilots enter weather conditions, unaware of its 
effect on flight, pilots may encounter hazardous weather phenomena.  
Weather Technology  
 
Weather technology and weather products have become a crucial component of the preflight 
process. During the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, researchers and engineers introduced a variety 
of graphical weather products in an attempt to give GA pilots access to more usable weather 
information (Tallotta et al., 1997). Early research results revealed that pilots with graphical 
weather information systems (GWIS) had better awareness of weather and less dependence on 
ground weather professionals, but this was accompanied with higher workload (Yucknovicz et 
al., 2000). Although the introduction of GWIS as well as radar (e.g., NEXRAD) have the ability 
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to increase pilots’ awareness and decrease weather information retrieval time, researchers have 
found repeatedly that pilots may use these devices to actually fly closer to hazardous weather 
conditions and maneuver around them (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; 
Berringer and Ball, 2004). Latorella & Chamberlain (2004) claim the NEXRAD display of storm 
cell location, intensity, and position in relation to the aircraft, made it easier for pilots to use the 
interface more strategically (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2004).  
Previous studies investigated how much degraded radar resolution affects pilots’ weather 
interpretation and decision-making (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2004). Results indicated that 
higher resolution NEXRAD radar images encouraged pilots to use technology tactically to 
maneuver through hazardous weather. Latorella & Chamberlain (2004; 2002) called for more 
research with high resolution radar images and IMC conditions to further explore this notion. 
Beringer and Ball (2004) also investigated the ranges of NEXRAD spatial resolution. Results 
were similar to Latorella & Chamberlain (2002) in that pilots who accessed higher resolution 
used the information to maneuver around and dodge hazardous weather (Beringer and Ball, 
2004) . In fact, the majority of pilots in the study violated the 20 statute mile distance from 
storms (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] & National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration [NOAA], 1983). This is similar to the findings in Wu, Gooding, Shelley, Duong, 
and Johnson (2012), where under similar conditions, pilots flew within the FAA suggested 20 
statue mile distance of convective weather, and disregarded hazardous weather avoidance 
practices.  Burgess & Thomas (2004) assessed the effect of new, innovative cockpit displays on 
pilot decision-making and weather avoidance. This study compared a novice display featuring 
NEXRAD image loop to a National Convective Weather Forecast. Results indicated no 
 43 
significant difference between groups’ weather avoidance performance regardless of condition 
(Burgess & Thomas, 2004). 
Portable Weather Technology. Recently the GA community has been investing in lower cost 
portable devices that map weather information along flight routes to improve pilots weather SA 
and weather avoidance. The majority of the portable weather technology (e.g. Foreflight) that are 
currently available are weather apps on tablets, smart phones, or smart watches. Industry is 
introducing more aviation weather apps each year (Dutcher & Doiron, 2008).  However, 
researchers have identified various human factors issues associated with portable weather 
devices.  For example, Schaub, Karl, and Weber (2010) found a lack of standardized training, 
device size, warning messages, and navigation all pose limitations to pilots’ ability to use 
portable weather devices.    
Additionally, Ahlstrom et al.(2016)  investigated the effect of portable weather devices on 
GA pilot behaviors, GA pilot weather situational awareness, and weather avoidance. Results, 
indicated the portable device increased pilots’ weather situation awareness. Also, the 
introduction of the portable device did not degrade pilot performance (Ahlstrom et al., 2016) . 
However, pilots still operated too close to degraded weather. As with other weather products and 
technology, any possible beneficial effects of weather apps may be limited by pilots lack of 
weather knowledge and device training (Ahlstrom et al., 2016). Ahlstrom et al.(2016) advocated 
for more research on aviation weather information interpretation training (Ahlstrom et al., 2016). 
Summary. Recently, research has attempted to improve preflight and inflight performance 
through new weather technology with improved usability. However, despite the advances in 
technology and weather product display, pilots often utilize the weather information to fly closer 
to deteriorating weather. GWIS and portable weather technology both have benefits and 
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limitations for presenting weather along pilots’ flight route. Latorella & Chamberlain (2002) 
claim that GWIS should assist pilots with realizing how weather conditions relate to the overall 
flight mission, this includes assisting pilots in predicting how weather will develop in the future, 
identifying when weather is hazardous, and suggesting actions (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002). 
However, previous research confirms that GWIS and portable weather applications do not assist 
pilots in safely navigating around hazardous weather. In fact, multiple studies claim GWIS may 
promote tactical maneuvers too close to degrading weather. Weather technology does not seem 
to mitigate pilots’ decision-making, situation assessment, and product interpretation errors.  
Furthermore, low experienced pilots poor preflight and inflight behavior does not seem to be 
mitigated through better weather technology. New technology may be unable to improve pilots 
understanding of weather and preflight performance due to pilot’s lack of ability to interpret 
weather products and understand basic weather theory.  
As aforementioned, product interpretation can be difficult for many reasons, pilots would 
need to understand product symbols, limitations, and application. Additionally, with the various 
products available, aviation weather principles may be very difficult for pilots to comprehend 
and apply. However, if pilots had access to a preflight planning guide to assist with product 
interpretation, pilots may be able to properly interpret products and gain understanding of 
product limitations. 
 Pilots may also benefit from assistance with preflight planning tasks.  It can be very 
challenging to understand which products to access and how to apply information to a flight plan 
(Wiggins et al., 2002). Novice pilots in particular struggle with goal formation decisions and 
information application (O'Hare, et al., 1994). On the other hand, if pilots were able to receive 
help through this process, pilots could practice perceiving preflight tasks as experts do. 
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Repetition of effective preflight practices could give pilots the experience to gain stronger 
feature associations and may help pilots associate appropriate risk with weather phenomena. 
In turn, effective preflight practices will likely lead to effective inflight processes and decision-
making. If pilots frame their weather-related diversions and alternate routes in terms of a “gain” 
instead of a loss, pilots may be less likely to continue into deteriorating weather. Therefore, 
through pilots practicing performing preflight planning using a “gains” mentality, this attitude 
may continue during inflight operations. Also, helping pilots plan diversions and alternate routes 
in case of emergency may encourage pilots to be more aware and proactive about hazardous 
weather inflight.  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the use of an aviation weather 
performance support tool would improve pilots preflight planning and inflight behavior. 
Aviation Weather Preflight Performance Support Tool Literature Review 
 
Automation and decision support tools have been applied to the aviation field; however, the 
application has been used primarily for navigational and aeronautical tasks.  There is limited 
research on applying information and decision automation application to aviation weather 
planning and decision-making. It is possible that by applying automation and decision support 
tool technology to aviation weather interpretation and planning, pilots’ preflight and inflight 
performance may improve. This section will review automation and decision support tool 
literature to determine which aspects and components will aid in assisting with the GA weather 
problem.  
Automation. Automation has been defined as the employment of automatic equipment into 
manufacturing or other processes. Automation levels and stages are used together to describe 
automated systems and tasks, and a particular system or process can be automated on varying 
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levels and types of automation. Automation levels range from low to high automation 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Hence, the automation type has four stages that 
mimic the information processing model, sensory processing, perception/working memory, 
decision-making, and response selection.  
The first stage describes automation applied to information sensing and registration 
processes. These processes and tasks involve sensory receptor, sensory processing, 
preprocessing, and selective attention (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). For instance, 
an example of a task in this stage would be the ordering or sequencing, information, such as the 
ordered response received from a Google search. In this task, automated algorithms sense the 
desired information from the user’s search term, and organize the information according to the 
most relevant information. At the very lowest level, this automation stage could represent the 
sensing of information, such as a temperature reading on a thermometer.  This level of assistance 
automation could help prevent pilots from missing vital weather information.  That is, previous 
research suggests that information acquisition is a task particularly difficult for 
novice/intermediate GA pilots.  However, when completing the preflight process gathering 
weather information is crucial to an effective preflight weather plan. Automation could help 
guide pilots on which weather products to access for preflight.  
The second stage of automation is processing and integration of information. This stage 
applies inferences to information, allowing for prediction (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 
2000; Baddeley, 1996). For instance, when users begin to enter a search term into Google, 
Google usually offers suggested terms to assist with their search. This function helps users better 
word their search terms, which in turn, can help users get better results. This stage of automation 
is also used in aviation weather. For instance, when sensors collect raw visibility and ceiling 
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information, such as “4 statute miles” and “overcast at 3,000 ft”, the code can sense this 
information and translate it into flight category, IFR or VFR. This may help eliminate error and 
provide assistance to novice pilots who are still learning flight category criteria. 
    The third stage of automation mirrors the decision-selection stage of the information 
processing model, where a decision is chosen from decision options (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2000).  Applying this stage of automation could involve varying levels of automation. 
A low level of automation would suggest action(s) to the user, whereas high levels of automation 
would make the decision. This level of automation is rarely used in aviation tools. However, one 
example could be the autopilot function when the system makes decisions about how to mitigate 
shifts in altitude and direction from environmental stimuli. Autopilot systems take into account 
weather phenomena, such as winds and pressure, and select the most efficient way to stay on 
course. 
    Lastly, the fourth stage “action implementation,” describes the task of completing a decided 
action (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). This stage is analogous to the action 
implementation step in the information processing model (Bennett & Flach, 1992). During this 
stage, instead of the human operator performing the action, automation uses mechanical 
hardware and software to execute the decided task. One primary example of automation stage in 
aviation is autopilot. Autopilot often decides and implements actions to navigate in response to 
environmental stimuli (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  
     The levels and stages can be combined in one system, with a system having multiple levels 
and stages of automation to meet the various system demands (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2000). For instance, consider the product “Google Home” (2018).  Google Home has 
varying levels of automations to meet different user needs. Google Home can complete action 
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implementation by executing a user demand, such as a user requesting a song to be played, or 
Google Home could perform decision selection and action implementation. The user could 
request Google Home to play a Jazz song and Google Home would select a Jazz song and play it. 
Furthermore, effective application of the various levels and stages of automation to various tasks 
is crucial for effective human and system performance. 
Automation levels and stages have numerous implications for human and system 
performance (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Previous research has investigated 
automation’s effect on four main human performance areas: mental workload, situation 
awareness, complacency, and skill degradation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  
First, consider the effect of automation on mental workload. Specifically, well-designed 
“information automation” can reduce operator mental workload so that tasks can be performed 
more effectively (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Data summaries, information 
highlighting, and integration can all help reduce operator workload. Information automation has 
been applied to different fields of aviation such as air traffic control. For example, air traffic 
control now has data blocks that features airplane speed, direction, and aircraft type on their 
scope of airplanes in their sector.  This reduces workload because the information is 
automatically fed to the operator’s screen, instead of the operator having to ask the pilot for the 
information.  Information automation can present information in a useful manner by priority and 
relevance which can help the operator make better decisions. 
However, if levels and stages are incorrectly applied to tasks, automation can lead to an 
increase in mental workload.  Specifically, automation can add more mental workload if it is 
difficult to start and engage, and this could lead to more costs to human performance, such as 
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situational awareness, complacency, and skill degradation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 
2000). 
Additionally, situation awareness should be considered when applying automation to tasks. 
Previous studies found that decision automation could limit operators’ situation awareness of the 
current operational environment. As a result, operators may be less aware of changes in their 
environment and unequipped to handle hazardous situations (Kaber, Omal, & Endsley, 1999; 
Endsley, 1996; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1995). Therefore, when applying 
decision automation instead of allowing the operator to be passive, engineers should attempt to 
engage the operator to preserve situational awareness. 
Another issue is the effect of automation on human complacency. If a high level of 
automation is applied to a task, the operator could over-rely on the automation and fail to 
identify automation errors (Wiener, 1981; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). For instance, 
when using autopilot, pilots may become complacent and fail to remain vigilant of the systems’ 
status. This could leave room for possible erroneous performance. Complacency may also be 
prevalent when applying automation cueing (i.e., highlighting important cues to attract the 
operator’s attention). Previous studies have identified that the employment of automated cue 
guiding could result in operators paying inadequate attention to the “un-cued” components of the 
task (Yeh, Wickens, & Seagull, 1999). Therefore, although operators may improve in some 
previously overseen aspect of a task, they may underperform on certain areas of a task they once 
mastered. Research suggest that the effects of complacency are greater with decision automation 
rather than information automation. Additionally, when automation is completely reliable, both 
information automation and decision automation equally increase human behavior (Crocoll & 
Coury, 1990). However, unreliability seems to negatively affect human behavior. 
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Automation research has also investigated automation effects on skill degradation. Decision 
automation could eventually lead to operator skill degradation (Rose, 1989). This could be 
prevalent especially with respect to disuse of automation (Kaber, Omal, & Endsley, 1999).  
When considering the multiple possible costs of high level decision automation, 
complacency, situational awareness, and skill degradation, it is imperative to appropriately apply 
automation to avoid these potential performance costs. These costs could be particularly harmful 
in high risk and high workload environments, such as general aviation. Therefore, automation 
reliability and trust should be considered before automation assignment in aviation 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). 
Trust and Reliability. Trust is another important construct to monitor when automating tasks. 
Depending on the reliability of automation and the nature of the tasks, trust can have an effect on 
human performance (Lee & See, 2004). Operators can have a lack of trust in an automated 
system, and instead of working with the automation, operators can waste time double checking 
the automated systems’ performance (Lee & See, 2004). This could lead to error, higher 
workload, and hazardous events. However, it is also possible operators can over rely on 
automation, which can also lead to erroneous behavior (Lee & See, 2004). It is important to 
produce reliable automation; research suggests that trust increases with unreliability and false 
alarms (Lee & See, 2004).  
    In summary, previous studies warn that the potential benefits of automation may also come 
with limitations or costs of applying automation. When applying automation, it is important to be 
cognizant of automation costs and mitigate them effectively. Carefully designed automation, 
however, may prove a useful tool to assist GA novice/intermediate pilots to understand aviation 
weather ant implications for flight. Since novice/intermediate pilots struggle with information 
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acquisition, comprehension, and application, perhaps applying the appropriate level of 
automation to various aviation weather tasks would help improve pilot preflight planning. 
Automation may be best applied through a decision support tool.  Decision support tool 
automation assists the user with completing tasks and making decisions and have been used in 
aviation and healthcare to help guide operators through tasks for years. The next section will 
review decision support tool literature to investigate the feasibility of applying this technology to 
aviation weather product interpretations, application, and preflight planning. 
Decision Support Tools. Decision Support Systems (DSS) are computer-based systems that 
aid operators in problem solving and decision-making tasks (Power & Sharda, 2009). In order to 
assist the user with making informed decisions, these systems often use a combination of data, 
documents, knowledge, and model algorithms. Essentially, DSS are designed to support and 
facilitate the decision process and adapt to fit the operator’s needs. Although DSS use 
automation to help the user make a decision, unlike decision automation, DSS do not make the 
decision for the operator.  
While various types of DSS that help support decision-making exist, the particular type of 
DSS of interest in the current study are knowledge driven DSS (Power & Sharda, 2009). Instead 
of using data and models like other DSS, knowledge driven/ expert DSS help provide operators 
with information concerning their task and suggest action to the operator. A knowledge driven 
DSS provides specified expertise in a certain topic and is equipped to help the operator 
understand and solve problems within that field. In addition to the data, document and 
knowledge driven DSS, there are also general and function-task specific DSS (Power & Sharda, 
2009). Function-task specific DSS are developed to support tasks and decision-making in a 
particular domain. This type of DSS is most useful when used to assist an operator to complete a 
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routine process or decision task. In contrast, general DSS support very broad tasks such as 
business management and business intelligence. Both function-task specific and general DSS can 
be data, document, model, or knowledge driven (Power & Sharda, 2009). The DSS of primary 
interest for this paper is Function-task specific knowledge driven DSS for aviation weather 
preflight planning. 
Although DSS have been theorized to help operators through the decision process, there are 
challenges associated with introducing DSS into existing complex systems and/or tasks (Cohen, 
Parasuraman, Serfaty, & Andes, 1997). Misuse of the DSS can actually decrease human machine 
performance and introduce new errors (e.g., over reliance, complacency and a degraded skill, 
degraded vigilance). How operators use DSS can be heavily influenced by under-trust and over-
trust of the system (Lee & Moray, 1992; Roth, Bennett, & Woods, 1988). One reason underlying 
the problems with trust between operators and DSS can be a result of a poorly developed mental 
model of how the DSS functions (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Fortunately, effective training on 
how to properly use DSS to assist with the decision process improves efficient human machine 
interaction with DSS (Cohen, Parasuraman, Serfaty, & Andes, 1997). 
Another factor for a decrease in performance could be “cognitive misers.” Cognitive misers, 
are individuals who try to perform tasks with the least amount of cognitive work as possible. 
This can lead to operators using DSS as a sort of heuristic and decrease the operators’ system 
situational awareness and decision-making. In these situations, human-machine teamwork can 
actually decrease productivity, and cause the human operator to be less vigilant and perform with 
less effort (Cohen, Parasuraman, Serfaty, & Andes, 1997). 
Clinical Decision Support Systems in Health Care. Despite the challenges associated with 
Decision Support tools/systems, knowledge-based decision support systems, clinical decision 
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support systems (CDSS) have been used in the medical field for the last 40 years (Barness, 
Tunnessen, Worely, Simmons, & Ringe,1974; Miller, Chanllinor, Masarie, & Myers, 1986). 
These systems were designed to aid physicians and assistants with diagnosis and other patient 
care processes. CDSS are usually composed of three primary components, the knowledge base, 
inference or reasoning, and the user interface. The “knowledge base” consists of relevant content 
and knowledge in an IF, THEN, and ELSE format. The “reasoning” component contains 
algorithms for combining rules and exceptions to assist the user. Lastly, the interface is how the 
user sends information to and receives information from the decision support system. System 
feedback can vary from recommendations, to alerts, and other information. 
Although, the medical field has applied CDSS to medical operations, there is limited research 
investigating the effectiveness of CDSS. There is also a lack of research investigating the exact 
impact and use of clinical decision support tools. For example, KLAS (2003) reviewed a site that 
used COPE systems that employed CDSS to apply alarms, decision aiding logic, and knowledge 
systems to reduce errors during ordering process. Results indicated that many sites only used ten 
or less alerts during order processes. This resistance to using alarms or alerts is a common 
response to automation and alarms, as users may distrust the system’s suggestions and alerts 
when they differ from the operators own assessment.  
Eccles, McColl, Steen, et al., (2002) analyzed the effects of a guideline-based decision 
support system in 31 general practice settings. Results indicated the CDSS system intervention 
had minimal improvement on health outcomes. A more detailed investigation revealed, 
practitioners failed to use the CDSS. In fact, practitioners often overrode and ignored system 
alerts and suggestions.  This lack of use or misuse of CDSS systems could be linked to poor 
system design and inadequate CDSs training. Teich  et al. (2000)  suggests that CDSS are most 
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effective when they align with the physician’s mental models and do not require them to change 
their processes.  
Additionally, there is also significant lack of research evaluating the effectiveness of CDSS 
that are broadly applied. Dombal (1991) and Adams, Chan, Cliffod et al., (1986) investigated the 
effectiveness of Leeds University CDSS for acute abdomen diagnosis. Additionally, results 
indicated that at the original site, where the decision aid was developed and implemented 
diagnosis, decision-making and patient outcome improved. Although the system performed well 
in the original local site of introduction, once applied to other sites the success rate decreased. 
However, despite the lack of literature regarding decision support tool effectiveness, The Office 
of the National Coordinator (ONC) for health information technology reported that 74 percent of 
physicians use a clinical decision support system the assists with drug interactions and effects 
and 57% use at least one clinical decision support tool that provides guidance and suggestions 
for screening tasks. This gap between research literature and commercial use of DSS is relevant 
in the aviation field and other fields as well. 
DSS Design. DSS design has implications for the effectiveness of the tool for the current 
study. It is crucial that DSS present task-related information in a useful and strategic manner, 
using heuristics strategies (e.g., using an “elimination by aspect” strategy to develop the interface 
design), that assist in user engagement and decision error avoidance (Karim, Hershauer, & 
Perkins, 1998). Although, implementing heuristic strategies in DSS design could prove useful, it 
is imperative that the implemented heuristics strategies match the needs of the user base. 
Arbitrarily assigning heuristics strategies to DSS design could result in a mismatch between use 
needs and system design and could promote more hazardous performance (Vicente, 1999). 
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In the aviation field, Wiggins & Bollwerk (2006), investigated user preferences for including 
heuristics information DSS design. During their study, participants were tasked to evaluate 
various airports and their features in order to decide the optimal airport for flight safety and 
scenario goals. While completing this task, participants had the opportunity to interact with three 
different heuristic DSS interfaces.  Afterwards, participants were asked which interface they 
preferred and which one they would use again. Results indicated interface choice was unrelated 
to decision accuracy, experience, demographic information, or information presentation 
effectiveness. Instead, interface preference was related to user perceived difficulty in comparing 
alternative airport features (e.g. runway information, landing fees, and maintenance facilities). 
Additionally, interface choice did indicate differences in information acquisition efficiency. 
Specifically, the “elimination by aspects” design took users more time to compare feature 
options than the “frequency and majority of confirming dimensions” interface did (Wiggins & 
Bollwerk, 2006). 
To further investigate user differences and interface preference, Harris & Wiggins (2008) 
investigated whether polychronicity (i.e., the preference for completing multiple tasks 
concurrently, instead of sequentially) could provide insight on user preference for heuristics 
preferences for DSS interfaces. However, results indicated there was no relationship between 
polychronicty and DSS interface design. Similar to Wiggins & Bollwek (2006), results indicated 
participant chose the interface that seemed less difficult, elimination by aspects (Harris & 
Wiggins, 2008).  
Perry, Wiggins, Childs, & Fogarty (2013) furthered this research by investigating the effect 
of various decision support system interface designs on inexperienced firefighters’ decision-
making. For this study, participants were tasked with completing a decision task. The 
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experimental conditions in this study included training (training vs. control), and DSS interfaces 
(quasi-analytical & intuitive), and the amount of control users had over the displayed information 
(pre-configured & self-configured). The two interface designs used in the study were the quasi 
analytical interface (access to information for 8 cues) and the intuitive interface (access to 
information for 3 cues). Participants were separated into two interface design groups and the 
control (no training) and training groups. Although training and DSS interfaces alone did not 
impact decision accuracy, pilots who received the intuitive interface, training and pre-
configuration had improved decision accuracy. Overall their results indicated that decision 
support systems influenced users to perform better decision accuracy and efficiency when the 
system is preconfigured and effectively highlights important cues. 
Lastly, Wiggins’ team revaluated user preference and accuracy in using various decision 
support tool interfaces in various stressful conditions (Morrison, Wiggins, & Porter, 2010). 
During the study, 40 crime scene investigators used DSS to access information and make 
decisions. For the first phase participants were introduced to each DSS interface. There were 
three DSS interfaces available: paired options-moderate control (majority of confirming 
dimensions), all options-full control (elimination by aspects), all options –limited control 
(satisficing) (Morrison, Wiggins, & Porter, 2010). During the second phase, participants chose 
their preferred DSS interface and used that interface to complete decision-making tasks with 
varying levels of time pressure. Results from the study revealed that “all options-full control” 
was the preferred DSS interface amongst users in in the low time pressure condition (Morrison, 
Wiggins, & Porter, 2010). While the preference for the all options-full control was not 
significant, this option was preferred during the high-pressure condition. The results support the 
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theory that user perception of difficulty of use and autonomy within the DSS were more valued 
than efficiency for preference in DSS interface design (Morrison, Wiggins, & Porter, 2010).  
Wiggins and his teams’ work investigated applying different heuristic-based strategies into 
decision support tool development.  Decision support systems (DSS) have the capability to 
relieve workload, reduce decision related errors, and assist with information acquisition 
(Workman, 2005). However, as indicated through prior research, without considering user 
autonomy, transparency, and adaptability in DSS design, automation limitations may outweigh 
the benefits. Hopefully through including these design elements, DSS will have better usability 
and user acceptance. 
DSS for Preflight Weather Tasks. Previous research suggests when implementing decision 
support tools or decision aids to consider several key variables: the level of automation, decision 
aid content/ subject matter expert involvement, usability and adaptability.  These factors will be 
discussed with respect to applying DSS to weather preflight tasks to improve preflight and 
inflight performance.  
As described earlier, during the preflight process, pilots have difficulty with the task of 
product interpretation and selection. If automation were applied to this task, a useful support 
system would suggest which weather products are essential for the pilot’s flight plan. The 
support system could also prompt the pilots to think about the weather information the way an 
expert would. That is, by offering tips and guidance, the support system could function like a 
coach or smart checklist to ensure the novice pilot is performing efficient information acquisition 
and conceptualizing the retrieved information. This type of automation would be mid-level 
information acquisition and analysis, where, the automated system is suggesting how novice 
pilots should access and interpret weather products. This type of automation is more effective 
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than high level type decision automation, where the automation makes decisions for the user 
(Shimon, 2009).  
Unfortunately, a possible negative effect of a DSS could be complacency and skill 
degradation (Wiener, 1981; Parasuraman, Molloy, &Singh, 1993). In terms of aviation weather, 
a novice pilot may be over-reliant on the support tool for assistance with interpreting weather 
products and attempts to interpret weather products without the support of the preflight decision 
aid, their performance may decrease instead of increase and, overtime, the novice pilot could 
become too dependent on the decision support tool. However, research suggests that 
complacency and overreliance issues are more common with decision automation rather than 
information automation (Crocoll & Coury, 1990).  And helping pilots by providing weather 
information automation could be well worth the risk of overreliance.  
Another way to mitigate risks with automation is to train users how to use the tool 
effectively. For example, when considering a decision support tool to aid low experienced pilots 
with the preflight process, the pilot must know how much assistance the system is able to 
provide. Pilots should not rely on the system to make decisions or provide feedback on their 
decisions if the systems’ only purpose is to provide informative suggestions. A discrepancy 
between user expectations and system performance can cause confusion and error prone activity 
(Cohen et. al, 1997). However, if users (in this case pilots) are trained how to use the product, the 
decision support tool could considerably reduce error and improve operations (Cohen et. al, 
1997).  
Content validity and user-centered design are also crucial for supporting human and decision 
support tool performance (Cohen et. al, 1997). Function and task specific decision support tools 
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use “experienced knowledge” to assist operators when performing tasks (Shimon, 2009). 
Therefore, the content validly of the knowledge-based information is crucial for improved 
performance. For example, a preflight decision support tool requires correct aviation and 
meteorological “knowledge” to help the pilots make informed decisions concerning their flight. 
If the system lacks accurate aviation or weather knowledge principles, it may leave the novice 
user unprepared to perform their tasks effectively. As a result, a tool that was designed to 
decrease workload and increase performance could actually hinder safe flight activity and 
introduce even more confusion to an already complicated environment. Therefore, multi- 
disciplinary teams are essential for ensuring content validity and system design. Both expert 
pilots and meteorologists are needed to verify the system is capable of providing proper guidance 
for novice users.  
Usability and human-centered design are important principles to consider during decision 
support tool development (Cohen et. al, 1997). Technology is too often applied to complex 
environments without taking the user into consideration. In the GA weather community, vendors 
continually attempt to improve technology to assist with pilots’ preflight and inflight 
performance. However, new weather technology such as RADAR and overlaid dynamic maps 
may actually encourage hazardous flight activity rather than prevent it (Latorella & Chamberlain, 
2002; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; Beringer and Ball, 2004). Previous research indicates that pilots 
with dynamic weather in the cockpit actually flew closer to degrading weather, compared to the 
control group (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; Beringer and Ball, 
2004). Instead of repeating previous mistakes, developers of aviation weather decision support 
tools must consider the pilot needs early in the design process. Increased system usability could 
assist with system transparency and trust (Cohen et. al, 1997). Furthermore, the more user 
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friendly the system is, the more transparent the systems’ functions will be for the pilot.  
Research also suggests that facilitating decision support tool automation customization could 
improve system transparency and human-machine interaction (Billings & Woods, 1994). For 
instance, if a novice pilot needs assistance with risk assessment but was improving on their 
product interpretation skills, the pilot could adjust the preflight decision support tool automation 
to focus on risk assessment rather than product interpretation (e.g., low automation on product 
interpretation and medium automation on risk assessment tasks). This way, the pilot can practice 
using their skills during product interpretation and receive more assistance with risk assessment. 
When implemented correctly, system customization could help specialize the decision support 
tool to effectively meet the users’ knowledge and skill deficiencies (Cohen et. al, 1997).  
Overall Literature Review Summary 
 
GA weather-related accidents have a sustained a very high fatality over the last 30 years. 
Further investigation into the accident data revealed, VFR into IMC accidents account for the 
majority of weather-related fatalities. Furthermore, low experienced private pilots have been 
hypothesized to have low aviation weather knowledge, poor weather SA, and inadequate aviation 
weather risk perception. Although there is limited research that assesses GA pilots’ weather 
knowledge and situation assessment, research claims poor aviation knowledge may be the 
underlying reason for poor pilot judgement, risk perception, and inadequate situation assessment. 
As a result, low experienced pilots may be incapable of proper preflight planning and weather 
avoidance due to their poor feature and cue association development. This may have severe 
consequences for inflight operations and may lead to fatal weather-related accidents. Moreover, a 
poor understanding of weather products and theory, may result in pilots having a limited mental 
map of inflight weather.   Consequently, a lack of weather situational awareness may lead to 
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poor decision-making and error.  It may be beneficial to consider new methods towards 
improving low experienced pilots’ aviation weather practices. Perhaps by providing pilots with a 
performance support tool to aid them in the preflight process, pilots’ understanding of weather, 
decisions, and inflight weather-related behavior may improve. Thus, decision support tool 
technology could assist novice/intermediate pilots through the aviation weather preflight process.  
To ensure the effectiveness of the Preflight Decision Support Tool, developers should consider 
decision aid content/ subject matter expert involvement, usability, and adaptability. Additionally, 
possible automation limitations, such as situational awareness decrements, complacency, and 
skill degradation, should be carefully monitored.  If all of these factors are considered, a DSS 
could be an effective option for assisting low hour novice pilots with preflight and inflight 
performance and weather avoidance.   
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of a Preflight Weather Decision Support 
Tool (PWDST) on participants’ preflight performance and inflight performance. For the purpose 
of this study, preflight and inflight performance will be operationally defined by three main 
principles, weather conditions assessment, risk assessment, and decision-making. 
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Figure 3. Dissertation Theoretical Model 
 
Therefore, this study will investigate the following hypotheses (see figure 3): 
Hypotheses Relating to Preflight 
 
The Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool will have a positive effect on participant’s 
preflight performance. Participants who use the tool will have better preflight performance than 
participants without the tool:  Information Acquisition, Weather Awareness, Risk Perception, 
and Decision Making (see figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Preflight Hypothesis Model H1, H2, H3, H4 
• Hypothesis 1 (H1). Participants who use the tool will access a greater amount of key 
products during preflight than participants without the tool.   
o IV: The Tool 
o DV: The percentage of crucial weather products that were accessed. 
Participants who use the tool will demonstrate a more accurate understanding of present and 
trending weather along the flight route than those participants who do not use the tool. 
Specifically: 
• Hypothesis 2a (H2A). Participants who use the tool will score higher on Subcategory 
Weather Phenomena in the Weather Assessment on the Post Preflight Survey than those 
participants who do not use the tool.  
• IV: The Tool 
• DV: Percent correct score on Subcategory Weather Phenomena Category 
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on the Post Preflight Survey 
• Hypothesis 2b (H2B). Participants who use the tool will score higher on Subcategory 
Weather Trending in in the Weather Assessment on the Post Preflight Survey than 
participants who do not use the tool.  
• IV: The Tool 
• DV: Percent correct Score on Subcategory Weather Trending on Post 
Preflight Survey 
• Hypothesis 3 (H3). Participants who use the tool will have more accurate risk perception 
concerning weather along their flight route than participants who do not use the tool. 
Participants who use the tool will score higher score on Risk Perception on the Post 
Preflight Survey than participants who do not use the tool.  
• IV: The Tool 
• DV: Percent correct score on Risk Perception on the Post Preflight Survey 
• Hypothesis 4 (H4). Participants who use the tool will make safer decisions during the 
preflight process than participants who do not use the tool. Participants who use the tool 
will score higher on Decision Making on the Post Preflight Survey than participants who 
do not use the tool.  
• IV: The Tool 
• DV:  Decision Making Go or no-go decision 
Hypotheses Relating to Inflight  
 
Participants who used the tool will have an output that will enable them to be more aware 
of weather conditions along their flight route than participants who do not use the tool (see figure 
5).  
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Specifically:  
 
Figure 5. Inflight Hypothesis Model H5 and H6 
 
• Hypothesis 5a (H5A). Participants who use the tool will score higher the Weather 
Subcategory Inflight Weather Phenomena on the post-inflight survey than participants 
without the tool. 
o IV: The Tool (Output) 
o DV: Percent correct score on Subcategory Weather Phenomena on the 
Post Inflight Survey 
• Hypothesis 5b (H5B). Participants who use the tool will score higher on the Weather 
Subcategory Inflight Weather Trending in the post-inflight survey than those participants 
who do not use the tool. 
o IV: The Tool(Output) 
o DV: Percent correct score on Subcategory Weather Trending in the Post 
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Inflight Survey 
Participants who use the tool will have a better understanding of weather risks along their 
flight route than participants who do not use the tool. Specifically: 
• Hypothesis 6 (H6). Participants who use the tool will spend less time flying into 
degraded weather conditions than those participants who do not use the tool. 
o IV: The Tool (Output) 
o DV: Decision Making (Time Weather IMC – how long participants flew 
into IMC) 
Relationship Between Preflight & Inflight Measures 
 
• Hypothesis 7 (H7): There will be a significant prediction of Decision Making by, 
Percentage of crucial weather products accessed, Weather Phenomena, Weather 
Trending, and Risk (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Inflight Hypothesis Model H7 
 
• Hypothesis 8 (H8): There will be a significant prediction of Time Flown into IMC by, 
Weather Phenomena, Weather Trending, Weather Change (see figure 7). 
 
 68 
 
Figure 7. Inflight Hypothesis Model H8 
 
Mediation Model 
• Hypothesis 9 (H9).  The impact of PWDST on Time Flown into IMC is effected by The 
effect of PWDST on Preflight risk on Time Flown Into IMC (see figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Inflight Hypothesis Model H9 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODS 
Experimental Design 
The study will be a between subjects, 2 group design. The purpose of this study is to assess 
the effect of a preflight decision support tool on novice pilots’ preflight and in turn, inflight 
performance. The experimental group will receive the preflight decision support tool, whereas, 
the control will not (see figure 9).   
 
    
 Preflight Decision Support Tool 
  
    
Control Group 
Experimental 
Group   
  
      
 
Figure 9. This figure is a pictorial representation of the experimental design. 
 
Participants 
Seventy-eight private pilots, 71 male and seven female with ages ranging from 18 to 30 
(Mage = 20.15, SD = 2.56) without instrument ratings, were recruited from a Southeastern US 
university. A total of 41 VFR private pilots were randomly assigned to the control group (no 
preflight decision tool) and 37 VFR private pilots were assigned to the experimental group 
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(preflight decision tool). This study was approved by the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Institutional Review board for participant protection and safety. For incentive, participants 
received $100 for participation upon completion of the study.  
Tables 3-5 contain more information about flight training, flight hours, and weather 
experience.  
Table 3.  
Type of Flight Training Received 
  
Type of Flight Training  n 
Part 61 34 
Part 141/ 142 Collegiate 7 
Part 141/ 142 Non Collegiate 36 
Military 1 
  
The majority of pilots completed their training at a Part 141 flight non collegiate flight 
program and a Part 61 fixed based operation training facility (FBO). 
Table 4. 
Mean and Median Total and Instrument Flight Hours 
 
   
  
    Flight Hours Instrument Hours Actual  
Condition n M (SD) Median M (SD) Median 
Control (No 
PWDST) 41 99.96 (40.34) 97.00 2.19 (4.30) 0.30 
Experimental 
(PWDST) 36 98.40 (34.08) 92.5 1.78 (3.00) 0.55 
 
Table 4 displays means and medians for total and instrument flight hours, as shown, both 
groups have very limited instrument inflight experience. 
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Table 5.  
Count of Participants that Have Experienced VFR into IMC 
  
Encountered Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) while flying VFR?  
Condition No Yes 
Control (No PWDST) 29 12 
Experimental 
(PWDST) 23 14 
 
 Table 5 displays how many participants have encountered Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC) while flying a VFR flight plan, both the control and experimental groups have 
had limited VFR into IMC experience.  
Table 6. 
 Mean Aviation Knowledge Score 
  
  Aviation Weather Knowledge Score 
Condition M (SD) 
Control (No 
PWDST) 45.10 (6.79) 
Experimental 
(PWDST) 44.75 (6.81) 
 
Table 6 depicts both the control and experimental groups’ aviation weather knowledge, both 
groups scored relatively low, under 50 percent correct, on the Aviation Weather Knowledge 
Exam. 
Independent Variable Related Materials   
The following materials were used in this study: Preflight decision support tool, Tool 
Training Video, and Control Video.  
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Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool. The Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool 
was wire-framed using Google Drive App Draw.io and the high fidelity mockup was created 
with AXURE software student license. The purpose of this tool is to guide users through the 
preflight process and improve preflight and inflight performance. The Preflight Weather 
Decision Support Tool (PWDST) is comprised of three main components; the preflight guide, 
the personal minimums sections, and the risk assessment and checklist output. 
The personal minimums section prompts users to set personal minimums for VFR flight. This 
section is modeled from the FAA’s suggested personal minimum format and has ten items for 
pilots to consider. For each item the pilot must identify their safety threshold. The PWDST 
features suggested minimums ranges for each item, and alerts the user if their limit is outside the 
suggested range. After completing all the fields successfully, the user will have a complete 
record of their safe VFR minimums.  
The preflight guide component guides the user through a set of weather products essential for 
effective preflight planning. For each product the PWDST will have tips for product 
interpretation and application, a form for note taking, and prompting decision-making questions. 
The product interpretation assistance feature uses automation and usability principles to provide 
legends and highlight key areas on weather products to simplify product interpretation.  
After guiding the user through all the essential weather products, the user is brought to the 
risk assessment and output section. This section summarizes the users notes gathered from the 
accessed weather products. During this stage, the information is presented, and the tool helps the 
user assign risk to reported weather phenomena. After assigning risk to the various weather 
conditions along their flight route, the app helps the user decide whether to embark on the flight 
or not. 
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PWDST Training Video. This video took 30 minutes for participants to complete and it was 
developed using Microsoft Video Maker. The purpose of the training video is to guide users 
through the main components of the PWDST. The video illustrates how to navigate the tool’s 
preflight guide, the personal minimums sections, and the risk assessment and checklist output.  
Control Video. This video took participants 30 minutes to complete and was retrieved from 
YouTube. The video reviews KAEL and KDTL airport information, including runway 
information, airport facility information, and NOTAMS.  
Experimental Task: Simulated flight scenario 
Participants performed a preflight and inflight of one aviation weather scenario. The flight 
scenario was a VFR into IMC scenario. In the scenario, the scheduled flight route started at the 
departure airport, KAEL, MN, and ended at the destination airport, KDTL, MN. The flight was 
estimated to last for 1 hour and 30 minutes. The aircraft used in this simulation was a Cessna 172 
G100, on a VFR direct GPS flight route. Table 7 shows the flight times and description.  
Table 7.  
Flight Route. 
VFR into IMC 
Location: KAEL, MN to KDTL, MN 
Time: Preflight 
2200Z (5 PM CDT, 
6 PM EDT) 
  Departure 
2300Z (6 PM CDT, 
7 PM EDT) 
  Destination 
0045Z (7:30 PM 
CDT, 8:30 PM EDT) 
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Description: 
Sky condition start clear with 10 
statute miles visibility. Midway at 
KPEX conditions clouds drop to 
overcast 800 ft, with thunderstorms in 
the vicinity and fog.  
 
Preflight. The purpose of this preflight was to closely mimic actual preflight processes. 
Pilots were provided the flight information, including route, departure arrival times, NOTAMs, 
additional airport information, and all weather information.  Historical weather products were 
collected from the Aviation Weather Website and the Pilot Training System website. A mock 
Aviation Weather Center website was designed using AXURE software to present all the 
weather needed for the preflight.  
Weather products featured on the website include: 
• METARs 
• TAF 
• Surface Analysis Chart 
• Surface Prognostic Charts 
• Low Level Significant Weather  
• Convective SIGMET 
• G-AIRMET 
o ZULU 
o Freezing level 
o Sierra 
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o Tango 
• Satellite   
• Winds Aloft 
• PIREP 
In addition to the weather information, pilots were also provided with Airport Diagrams, 
ASOS and AWOS Frequencies, E6B Electronic Flight Calculator, Aeronautical Sectional Charts, 
Chapter 5 of the Cessna 172 Aircraft Manual, and the ERAU Navigational Log Sheet to 
complete the preflight scenario. Pilots were instructed to perform Preflight Planning tasks, as if 
they were actually about to embark on the flight.  
Inflight Simulation. The flight scenario was designed to present accurate yet changing 
weather conditions.  As displayed in Table 8, the weather conditions during the flight changed 
somewhat from the weather forecasts and observations available to the pilot during pre-flight.  
At the beginning of the simulated flight, pilots experienced VFR conditions and as the pilot 
approached KAXN, weather conditions started to deteriorate with lowering clouds and decreased 
visibility. When pilots reached KADC, weather conditions were IMC with thunderstorms and 
rain in the area, and pilots were required to either divert or fly IFR operations. Once pilots 
reached within 5 nautical miles of the destination, KDTL, the simulation ended.  
Table 8.  
Flight Route Weather Development 
Airport Preflight METARs (AGL) Preflight 
Forecasted 
Outlook (TAF) 
Simulated  WX (AGL) 
KAEL 
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METAR KAEL 142154Z 
AUTO 17007KT 10SM 
CLR 33/14 A2972 RMK 
AO 
TAF KMKT 
141735Z 
1418/1518 
18011KT P6SM 
FEW250  
    FM150000 
15008KT P6SM 
SCT200  
    FM150600 
18010KT P6SM 
BKN200  
    FM151500 
19009KT P6SM 
SCT250  
METAR KAEL 150055Z 
AUTO 15008KT 10SM 
CLR 27/16 A2974 RMK 
AO2 
KADC METAR KADC 142152Z 
AUTO 12004KT 10SM 
CLR 29/18 A2966 RMK 
AO2 
METAR KADC 150053Z 
AUTO 01009KT 10SM 
OVC009 21/19 A2972 RMK 
AO2 LTG DSNT N 
KDTL METAR KDTL 142154Z 
AUTO 02007KT 10SM 
OVC011 22/18 A2971 
RMK AO2 
METAR KDTL 150054Z 
AUTO 02003KT 10SM 
VCTS OVC008 19/17 
A2976 RMK AO2 LTG 
DSNT N AND NE 
 
Flight Simulator. The desktop flight simulation was implemented with PREPAR3D, version 3 
(Lockheed Martin, 2017).  The Active Sky (Active Sky 2016, Version 3) add-on weather was 
used to depict high fidelity weather within the PREPAR3D simulation environment.  
 
Dependent Variables/Measures    
For the purpose of this study, performance was defined in terms of risk assessment, 
weather interpretation/application, information acquisition, and decision-making. A combination 
of observation tools and surveys were used to measure these constructs in both preflight and 
inflight portions of the scenario.  
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Survey Measures. All surveys were developed online using the Qualtrics survey 
software. The participant background surveys (see below) were provided online, and participants 
completed online surveys on their device of choice.  
All the measures were separated into three primary groups Background Surveys, Preflight 
Surveys, and Inflight Surveys. Table 9 displays survey measure and cronbach alphas. 
Table 9.  
Scales Means & Reliability 
     
Scale Item Number 
Cronbach's 
α 
M (SD) 
Post Preflight Survey    
 Preflight Weather 
Phenomena 8 0.71 85.6 (18.9) 
 Preflight Weather Trending 6 0.88 49.1 (39.3) 
 Preflight Risk 3 0.81 35.5 (40.7) 
Post Inflight Survey    
 Inflight Weather 
Phenomena 6 0.73 62.6 (30.4) 
  Inflight Weather Trending 2 0.83 87.8 (30.4) 
 
The purpose of the participant background surveys was to get a baseline measurement of 
participants’ flight experience, weather experience, product familiarity, confidence in knowledge 
of weather skills and principles, and risk assessment abilities. These include the following five 
surveys: 
Demographic Survey. The demographic survey was composed of 85 items. The demographic 
survey items covered topics such as participant age, flight training, flight experience, weather 
training, and weather experience (see Appendix A). 
Product Usage Questionnaire. The product usage questionnaire was comprised of 105 items 
(see Appendix B). The survey identified which weather products (i.e., observations and forecasts) 
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participants use the most often and how much participants value various weather products and 
weather product source information. First, participants were prompted to rate how valuable 
information is from each product and product source on a five point likert scale. Then participants 
were prompted to indicate which products/products sources they rely on for the most up to date 
weather information during preflight and while inflight. 
Self-Efficacy. The self-efficacy questionnaire contained 105 items (see Appendix C). The 
survey focused on participant’s confidence in their knowledge, skills, and ability to access, 
interpret, and apply aviation weather information. For each item, participants were asked to rate 
their confidence on a scale from “0 Cannot do at all”, to “Highly certain I can do”. 
Weather Knowledge. The weather knowledge assessment consisted of 45 multiple choice 
items, the topics covered include weather products interpretation, knowledge of product 
limitations, and ability to apply weather information. The questions are an adaption of the 
weather knowledge assessment developed by Blickensderfer et. al., (2017). 
Preflight Survey. This survey measured risk assessment, weather interpretation/application, 
and decision-making after the pilot had completed the preflight and was ready to fly the 
simulation (see Appendix D). This survey prompted participants to predict how weather will 
develop and describe weather at the destination, en-route, and departure airport. Participants 
were also asked how risky the reported weather conditions is and their confidence in their risk 
assessment. Lastly, participants were asked about their decision to fly the flight route and 
whether they planned a diversion route and airport. 
Tool Training Quiz. This quiz tested participants’ ability to navigate the PWDST as well as 
their perceived usability of the tool. 
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Control Training Quiz. This quiz tested participants on their knowledge of the information 
presented in the Control Video, including KAEL and KDTL airport information, runway 
information, airport facility information, and NOTAMS. 
Inflight Survey. The post-scenario weather situation assessment survey was a retrospective 
survey (completed after flying the simulation) and measured participant risk assessment, weather 
interpretation/application, and decision-making regarding the inflight portion of the scenario (see 
Appendix E). This survey prompted participants to report decisions made during the inflight 
simulation and to describe weather observed during the inflight simulation at the destination, en-
route, and departure airport. Participants were also asked to rate how risky their decisions were 
inflight, asked how risky the inflight weather conditions were, and their confidence in their risk 
assessment. Lastly, participants were asked about their decisions to get inflight weather, their 
flight path, and whether or not they decided to divert or not.  
Observational Measures 
 Behavioral measures were used to assess performance for the preflight and inflight 
portions of the scenario.   
         Preflight Observational Measures. In order to measure information acquisition, the Ice 
Cream screen recoding tool was used to record information acquisition frequency and accuracy 
during the preflight scenario.  
Inflight Observational Measures. Ice Cream screen recording tool was used to record the flight 
to later obtain the following inflight measures:  
• Total Flight Time in IMC: This represents the total time during the inflight 
simulation acenario that participants flew in IMC. 
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• PIREPs of Weather Change: Participants identified and reported when weather 
changes significantly during the inflight simulation scenario. 
Tables 10 and 11 display a summary of the survey and observational measures for preflight and 
inflight, respectively.   
 
Table 10. 
 Preflight Measures 
Preflight Scenario Measures 
Construct Observation  Tool 
Weather Product 
Knowledge/ Limitations 
Weather Information 
Frequency  
Ice Cream 
Screen 
Recording 
Construct Survey Tool 
Weather Awareness, 
Risk, Decision making 
Preflight Survey Qualtrics 
 
Table 11. 
 Inflight Measures 
Inflight Simulation Scenario Measures 
Construct Observation  Tool 
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Procedure 
 
 Once participants arrived at the data collection site they were briefed. Each participant 
reviewed and signed an informed consent from. Then participants received an email with a link 
to all the background surveys, and participants completed all the surveys at home on the device 
of their choice. After completing the background surveys, the participants were scheduled for an 
appointment to complete the preflight and flight scenario. When participants arrived at their 
appointment they will again be briefed about the study. Next, participants completed the 
Aviation Weather Knowledge Exam. Then, the control group was given a 20-minute aviation 
video to watch. Whereas, the experimental group was trained on how to use the Preflight 
Decision Support Tool. After the training, the experimental group took a proficiency quiz and a 
usability assessment on the PWDST.  After the control video, the control group took a quiz on 
the information in the aviation video. Afterwards, all participants completed the preflight 
scenario followed by the preflight survey. Then, all participants completed the inflight simulation 
followed by the inflight survey. Finally, each participant was debriefed and given their 
Weather Awareness 
PIREP Reporting of current 
weather conditions 
Voice Recorder 
Decision Making 
Time spent flying into 
hazardous weather 
Ice Cream Screen 
Recording 
Construct Survey Tool 
Risk, Weather Awareness  Inflight Survey Qualtrics 
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compensation.  See Table 12 for estimated completion times.  At the completion of the study, 
participants were debriefed and compensated $100.00.  
 
Table 12.  
Procedures 
 Procedure 
Phases Time Control Group Experimental 
Phase 1 
 
10 minutes Brief  
2 minutes Consent Form 
15 minutes Demographics 
10 minutes Self-Efficacy 
20 minutes Product Frequency of Use 
 Total: 57 
minutes 
 
   
Phase 2 40 minutes Weather Knowledge Assessment 
20 minutes Tool Training  Aviation Video 
10 minutes Tool Training Quiz Aviation Video Quiz 
1 hour Preflight Scenario  
15 minutes Post Preflight Survey  
1 hour Inflight Simulation Scenario 
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15 minutes Post Inflight Survey 
10 minutes Debrief & Compensation 
Total: 3 hours 
50 minutes 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 
Preflight Hypotheses Analyses 
 
The first analysis assessed the Preflight Hypotheses one, two, and three.   
A one-way, between subjects MANOVA was run to investigate the experimental and control 
group differences in preflight performance variables. Four dependent variables were included: 
Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight Weather Trending, 
Preflight Risk. The independent variable is the PWDST.  Tables 13 and 14 display the 
intercorrelations and descriptive statistics.  
Table 13.  
Correlations for Preflight Variables 
          
  Variable n M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Preflight Weather Phenomena  78 85.58 18.91 ---     
2 Preflight Weather Trend 78 49.15 39.28 0.18 ---    
3 Preflight Risk 78 35.47 40.68 0.10 0.55** ---   
4 Preflight Percent of Key Products Accessed 78 58.62 39.95 0.26* 0.22* 0.27* ---  
5 PWDST a 78 0.47 0.50 0.30** 0.20 0.27* 0.91** --- 
         
 
a 0 = Control Group (No PWDST) and 1= Experimental Group (PWDST). *p < .05 **p < .01 
 
Table 14. 
 Mean Scores for PWDST on Preflight Dependent Variables 
       
  Control Group Experimental Group Total 
Variables M SD M SD M SD 
Preflight Weather Phenomena 80.95 21.95 90.97 12.89 85.58 18.91 
Preflight Weather Trend 43.25 39.83 56.02 38.04 49.15 39.28 
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Preflight Risk 26.98 36.99 45.37 43.02 35.47 40.68 
Percent of Key Products 
Accessed 27.71 26.41 94.70 14.48 58.62 39.95 
 
The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:  
• Outliers. Boxplots and Mahalanobis Distances were conducted revealing 12 univariate 
outliers and one multivariate outlier in the data set. Both univariate and multivariate 
outliers were not removed for this analysis.  
• Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated all dependent variables 
(Percent of Key Products Accessed, Weather Phenomena, Weather trending, and Risk 
scores) were not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, 
PWDST (p < .001). 
• Multicollinearity & Singularity. A Pearsons Correlation indicated there was no 
multicollinearity found amongst the dependent variables (see Table 13).  
• Linearity. Scatterplots were developed to investigate linearity, and indicated that there 
were no linear relationships between the DVs .  
• Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. A Box's test of equality of covariance matrices 
was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variance-covariances matrices, the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance-covariances was violated  (p < .001).  
• Homogeneity. The Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance revealed the assumption 
of homogeneity of variances was also violated (p < .001). 
 
Due to the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, 
Pillai’s Trace criterion was used instead of Wilks’ lambda to evaluate multivariate significance 
(Olson, 1979; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013, p. 254). The omnibus multivariate test results 
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indicated, that there was a statistical significant main affect of the PWDST on the combined 
DVs, F(4, 73) = 89.43, p =.000; Pillai’s Trace = .831; partial η2 = .831.  
 
Figure 10. Effect of PWDST on Preflight Performance 
As a result of the assumption of equality of variances being violated for Preflight 
Weather Phenomena, Preflight Risk, and Percent of Key Products Accessed, a more conservative 
alpha level of .0125 was used for determining significance in the follow-up univariate F-test. 
When the results for the DVs were considered separately with univariate ANOVAs, there was a 
statistical significant main effect of the PWDST on Preflight Weather Phenomena Score ( F [1, 
76] = 356.12, p =.007, partial η2 = .09) and Percent of Key Products Accessed (F [1, 76] = 
356.12, p = .000, partial η2 = .82). Additionally, results indicated there was not a statistically 
significant main effect of the PWDST on Preflight Risk (F [1, 76] = 356.12, p = .018, partial η2  
= .072) and Weather Trend (F [1, 76] = 356.12, p = .085, partial η2  = .038). Bonferroni Post Hoc 
tests revealed that participants that used the PWDST scored significantly higher on Preflight 
Weather Phenomena (M= 80.18, SD = 21.83, p =0.007) and accessed a statistically significant 
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higher Percent of  Key Weather Products (M= 96.56, SD = 10.35, p < .001. There were no other 
significant findings (see figure 10).  
As a result, there is partial support of the preflight hypotheses (H1, H2a, H2b, H3).  We 
accept the alternate hypothesis one and hypothesis 2(A) but do not reject the null hypothesis 2(B) 
or null hypothesis three. 
Table 15.  
Hypotheses Testing: One, Two, and Three 
     
Hypotheses Null / Alternate Description Accept 
Do not 
Reject 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
1 H10 
PWDST has no effect on Percent of 
Key Products Accessed during preflight 
planning 
  
H1a 
PWDST has a positive effect on 
Percent of Key Products Accessed 
during preflight planning.  
X  
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
2 
H2A0 
PWDST has no effect on Preflight 
Subcategory Weather Phenomena 
Score. 
  
H2Aa 
PWDST has a positive effect on 
Preflight Subcategory Weather 
Phenomena Score.  
X  
H2B0 
PWDST has no effect on Preflight  
Subcategory Weather Trending score.  
 X 
H2Ba 
PWDST has a positive effect on 
Preflight Subcategory Weather 
Trending Score.  
  
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
3 H30 
PWDST has no effect on Preflight Risk 
Perception. 
 X 
H3a 
PWDST has a positive effect on 
Preflight Risk Perception.  
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Next, a logistic regression was run to assess the degree to which the four preflight measures 
(Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight Weather phenomena, Preflight Weather trending, 
and Preflight Risk) predicted Preflight Decision Making. This was used to test Hypothesis seven.  
Tables 16 and 17 display the intercorrelations and descriptive statistics.  
Table 16. 
Correlations for Preflight Variables including Go or No-Go Decision 
         
 
  Variable n M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Preflight Weather Phenomena  78 85.58 18.91 ---     
2 Preflight Weather Trend 78 49.15 39.28 0.18 ---    
3 Preflight Risk 78 35.47 40.68 0.10 0.55** ---   
4 Preflight Percent of Key Preflight Products Accessed 78 58.62 39.95 0.26* 0.22* 0.27* ---  
5 Go or No Go decision a 78 0.47 0.50 0.071 -0.31** -0.64** -0.18 --- 
         
 
a 0 = No Go and 1 = Go  *p < .05 **p < .01 
  
 
Table 17.  
Descriptive Statistics & T-Test results for Preflight including Go or No-go Decision 
Variable 
Not  
Going 
VFR 
Flight 
Plan 
Going 
On VFR 
Flight 
Plan 
 t (138) p 
  
Weather Phenomena 83.98 86.68 -0.62 0.538   
Weather Trend 63.54 39.13 2.82 0.006   
Risk 66.67 13.77 6.87 0.000   
Percent of Key 
Products 67.05 52.77 1.57 0.121   
 
The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:  
• Linearity. Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the dependent 
variable was assessed using the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni correction 
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was applied, resulting in a more conservative alpha level, p < .00625 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2014). Based on this assessment, all continuous independent variables were found 
to be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable, except for Preflight Risk, p < 
.00625 . 
• Multicollinearity & Singularity. A Pearsons Correlation indicated there was no 
multicollinearity found amongst the dependent variables (see table 16).  
• Outliers. There were two standardized residuals with values of 3.613 and -3.023 standard 
deviations, these cases were kept in the analysis. 
Table 18.  
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Go or No Do on Preflight  Performance Variables 
         
              
95% CI for Odds 
Ratio 
Variable B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio Lower Upper 
Preflight Weather 
Phenomena 0.022 0.16 1.98 1 0.159 1.022 0.991 1.055 
Preflight Weather 
Trend 0.003 0.009 0.117 1 0.732 1.003 0.985 1.022 
Preflight Risk -0.044 0.011 17.708 1 0.00 0.957 0.937 0.97 
Percent of Key 
Products -0.003 0.008 0.162 1 0.687 0.997 9.87 1.013 
 
A direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of Percent of Key 
Products Accessed, Weather phenomena, Weather trending, and Risk on the likelihood that 
respondents would decide to embark on the prompted VFR flight plan or not. The full model 
containing all four predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (4, N = 78) = 37.90, p = .000, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who decided to embark on 
the prompted VFR flight plan or not. The model as a whole explained between 38.5% (Cox and 
Snell R square) and 51.9% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in Preflight Decision Making, 
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and correctly classified 80.8% of cases. As shown in Table 18, “Preflight Risk” was the only 
variable that made a unique, statistically significant contribution to the model, recording an odds 
ratio of .96. This indicates that respondents who scored lower on Preflight Risk (i.e., perceived 
the flight as low risk regarding weather) were .96 times more likely to decide to embark on the 
prompted VFR flight plan, controlling for other factors in the model. 
These results provide partial support of Hypothesis 7.  We accept the alternate hypothesis 
for Preflight Risk, but do not reject the null Hypothesis 7 for Percent of Key Products Accessed, 
Preflight Weather Phenomena, or Preflight Weather Trending.  
 
 
 
Table 19.  
Hypothesis Testing: Seven 
     
Hypotheses Null / Alternate Description Accept 
Do not 
Reject 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
7 
H70 
There is not a significant prediction of 
Decision Making by Percentage of 
crucial weather products accessed, 
Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight 
Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk.  
  X 
H7a 
There is a significant prediction of 
Decision Making by Percentage of 
crucial weather products accessed, 
Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight 
Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk.  
    
 
Inflight Hypotheses Analyses 
 
Next, a one-way, between groups MANOVA was run to investigate the experimental and 
control group differences on inflight performance variables (Hypotheses five and six). Three 
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dependent variables were included: Inflight Weather Phenomena, Inflight Weather Trending, and 
Total Time in IMC. The independent variable was the PWDST. The descriptive statistics and 
intercorrelation matrix for the inflight variables are shown in Table 20 and 21.  
Table 20. 
Correlations for Inflight Variables 
          
  Variable n M SD 1 2 3 4  
1 Inflight Weather Phenomena  78 62.61 30.41 ---     
2 Inflight Weather Trend 78 87.82 30.35 0.37** ---    
3 Inflight Total Time in IMC 78 285.64 447.1 0.10 0.32** ---   
4 PWDST a  78 0.47 0.5 -0.113 0.001 -0.13 ---  
          
a 0 = Control Group (No PWDST) and 1= Experimental Group (PWDST). *p < .05 **p < .01 
 
  
 
Table 21.  
Descriptive Statistics Inflight Variables and Experimental Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:  
• Outliers. Boxplots and Mahalanobis Distances were conducted revealing 17 univariate 
outliers and no multivariate outliers. The univariate outliers were not removed for this 
analysis.  
 
        
  Control Group   Experimental Group   Total 
 n = 42  n = 36  n = 78 
Variable M SD   M SD   M SD 
Inflight Weather 
Phenomena 65.85 29.33 
 59.01 31.57  62.61 30.41 
Inflight Weather 
Trend 87.8 31.19 
 87.84 29.83  87.82 30.35 
Total Time in IMC 340.50 495.73   224.85 383.88   285.64 447.14 
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• Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated all dependent variables: 
Weather Phenomena, Weather Trending, and Total Time in IMC were not normally 
distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < .05). 
• Multicollinearity & Singularity. A Pearsons Correlation indicated there was no 
multicollinearity found amongst the dependent variables (see table 20).  
• Linearity. Scatterplots were developed to investigate linearity, results indicated there 
was no linear relationship between the DVs.  
• Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. A Box's test of equality of covariance matrices 
was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variance-covariances matrices, the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance-covariances was satisfied (p = .647).  
 
The omnibus multivariate test results indicated, there was not a statistical significant 
main effect of PWDST on the combined DVs, F(3, 74) = .622, p = .603; Pillai’s Trace = .025; 
partial η2 = .025.  
 
Figure 11. Effect of PWDST on Inflight Performance 
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Table 22.  
Hypotheses Testing: Five and Six 
     
Hypotheses Null / Alternate Description Accept 
Do not 
Reject 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
5 
H5A0 
PWDST does not have an effect on 
Inflight Subcategory Weather 
Phenomena score. 
 X 
H5Aa 
PWDST has a positive effect on Inflight  
Subcategory Weather Phenomena 
Score.  
  
H5B0 
PWDST does not have an effect on 
Inflight Subcategory Weather Trending 
score .  
 X 
H5Ba 
PWDST has a positive effect on Inflight 
Subcategory Weather Trending Score.  
  
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
6 H60 
PWDST does not have an effect on 
Total Time in IMC.  
 X 
H6a 
PWDST has a negative effect on Total 
Time in IMC. 
  
 
Next, a multiple regression was used to assess the ability of three measures (Inflight Weather 
phenomena, Inflight Weather trending, and Inflight Weather Change) to predict Total Time in 
IMC, assessing Inflight performance (hypothesis nine). Tables 23 and 24 display the 
intercorrelations, descriptive statistics, and regression results.  
Table 23.  
Intercorrelations for Inflight Variables 
  Variable n M SD 1 2 3 4  
1 Inflight Weather Phenomena  78 62.61 30.41 ---     
2 Inflight Weather Trend 78 87.82 30.35 0.37** ---    
3 Inflight Weather Change a 78 0.69 0.46 0.11 0.03 ---   
 95 
4 Total Time in IMC  78 0.59 0.5 0.32** 0.10 -0.07 ---  
         
 
a 0 = Did Not Report PIREP At Weather Change and 1= Reported PIREP At Weather Change. *p < .05 **p < .01 
 
The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:  
• Independence of Observations. The Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated to assess 
independence of residuals, results indicated there was not an independence of residuals, 
.617. 
• Linearity. Partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values were developed to ensure approximate linearity. 
• Homoscedasticity. Visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values, indicated the assumption of homoscedacity was 
violated. 
• Multicollinearity. Tolerance values were assessed and the assumption of 
multicollinearity was satisfied, since both tolerance values greater than 0.1. 
• Outliers, High leverage points, and Highly influential points. There were no 
studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations, no leverage values 
greater than 0.2, and values for Cook's distance above 1. 
• Normality. A Q-Q Plot was generated to assess the assumption of normality, this 
assumption was violated. 
A standard multiple regression was used to assess the ability of three measures (Inflight 
Weather trending, Inflight Weather Phenomena, and Inflight Weather Change,) to predict Total 
Time in IMC. The multiple regression model significantly predicted Total Time in IMC, the total 
variance explained by the model as a whole was 10.0%, F (3, 74) = 2.729, p =.05. Only Inflight 
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Weather Phenomena was statistically significant (beta = 4.72, p = .008). Regression coefficients 
and standard errors can be found in Table 24 (below). 
Table 24.  
Regression Analysis Summary for Inflight Performance Variables Predicting Inflight Decision Making 
Variable B SE B β t p  
Inflight Weather Phenomena 4.72 1.74 0.32 1 0.008  
Inflight Weather Trend -0.30 1.78 -0.02 1 0.866  
Inflight Weather Change 16.92 108.18 0.02 1 0.88  
 
These results provide partial support of Hypothesis 8, and we accept the alternate hypothesis 
for the variable Inflight Weather Phenomena, but we do not reject the null Hypothesis 8 for the 
variables Inflight Weather Trending or Inflight Weather Change. 
Table 25.  
Hypotheses Testing: Eight 
     
Hypotheses Null / Alternate Description Accept 
Do not 
Reject 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
8 H80 
There is not a significant prediction of 
Time Flown into IMC by Inflight 
Weather Phenomena, Inflight 
Weather Trending, Inflight Weather 
Change.  
    
H8a 
There is a significant prediction of 
Time Flown into IMC by Inflight 
Weather Phenomena, Inflight 
Weather Trending, Inflight Weather 
Change.  
X   
 
A series of regression analyses (Hayes, 2013) was used to investigate the hypothesis that 
Preflight Risk mediates the effect of PWDST on Time Flown Intro IMC. The total effect of the 
manipulation on Time Spent in IMC was significant c = -279.785, t(121) = -3.0492 p = 0.0033. 
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With 95% confidence, Tc resides somewhere between −462.834  and -96.736. The direct effect 
is also statistically different from zero, c′ = -273.931, t(120) = -2.840 p = .0060. The null 
hypothesis that T c′ = 0 can be rejected. The interval estimate for T c′ is  -466.441  to -81.422 
with 95% confidence. However, indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures 
(Hayes, 2013) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. The bootstrapped 95% confidence interval 
ranged from -76.1089  to 52.8233. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant and 
mediation did not have an effect. 
 
Figure 12. Preflight Risk as a mediator between the effect of PWDST on Time Flown Intro IMC 
These results do not support Hypothesis 9, and we do not reject the null hypothesis 9. 
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Table 26.  
Hypotheses Testing: Ten 
     
Hypotheses Null / Alternate Description Accept 
Do not 
Reject 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
9 H90 
The impact of PWDST on Time Flown 
Into IMC is not effected by Preflight 
risk.  
  X 
H9a 
There is a significant prediction of Time 
Flown into IMC by, Weather 
Phenomena, Weather Trending, 
Weather Change.  
    
 
Exploratory Analyses 
The analyses reported in this section were not included in the original set of analyses. 
These analyses were conducted to further investigate possible effects, relationships, hypotheses, 
and results.  
Investigation of Preflight and Inflight Performance Variable Relationships. In order to 
understand preflight and inflight variable relationships an intercorrelation matrix was conducted. 
Results indicated very small insignificant relationships between Inflight and Preflight Variables 
(see Table 27). 
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Table 27.   
Correlations for Preflight and Inflight Perform
ance V
ariables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
V
ariable 
n 
M
 
SD
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
Preflight W
eather Phenom
ena  
78 
85.58 
18.91 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Preflight W
eather Trend 
78 
49.15 
39.28 
0.18 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Preflight Risk 
78 
35.47 
40.68 
0.10 
0.55** 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Preflight Percent of K
ey 
Products A
ccessed 
78 
58.62 
39.95 
0.26* 
0.22* 
0.27* 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
PW
D
ST a 
78 
0.47 
0.50 
0.30** 
0.20 
0.27* 
0.91** 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Preflight G
o or N
o G
O
 on V
FR 
Flight b 
78 
0.59 
0.50 
0.07 
-0.31** 
-0.64** 
-0.18 
-0.20 
--- 
 
 
 
 
7 
Inflight W
eather Phenom
ena  
78 
62.61 
30.41 
-0.15 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.13 
-0.11 
0.09 
--- 
 
 
 
8 
Inflight W
eather Trend 
78 
87.82 
30.35 
-0.18 
0.14 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.37** 
--- 
 
 
9 
Inflight W
eather Change c 
78 
0.69 
0.46 
0.08 
0.08 
-0.06 
-0.06 
-0.05 
0.05 
0.11 
0.03 
--- 
 
10 
Inflight Total Tim
e in IM
C 
78 
285.6 
447.14 
-0.14 
-0.22 
-0.10 
-0.16 
-0.13 
0.15 
0.32** 
0.10 
-0.07 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 0 = Control G
roup (N
o PW
D
ST) and 1= Experim
ental G
roup (PW
D
ST). b 0 = N
o G
o and 1 = G
o
  *p < .05 **p <
 .01. c 0 = D
id N
ot Reported Pirep A
t 
W
eather Change and 1= Report Pirep A
t W
eather Change. 
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Retest of Hypotheses Four.  Initially, the Preflight MANOVA was intended to assess the 
effect of the PWDST on all preflight measures (Preflight Percent of Key Products Accessed, 
Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight Weather Trending, Preflight Risk, and Preflight 
Decision Making). However, during data processing, the preflight decision-making construct 
resulted in dichotomous data (GO or No Go decision) instead of a continuous variable. 
Therefore, the decision-making variable was unable to be included in the MANOVA analysis, 
and instead the difference in conditions groups responses in Preflight Decision Making (GO or 
No GO) was assessed using the Test of Two Proportions (i.e., a chi-square analysis). 
The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:  
• Dichotomous Variables: One Independent Variable and One Dependent Variable. 
This assumption was satisfied.  
• Independence of Observations. The assumption of independence of observations was 
satisfied. 
• Randomly Assigned Groups. The assumption of randomly assigned groups was 
satisfied.  
• Sample Size. The minimum expected frequency in any of the cells is 15.20, which 
is greater than 5. Therefore, the assumption of adequate sample size was satisfied. 
 
The test of two proportions used was the chi-square test of homogeneity in order to compare 
differences in proportions for the PWDST condition (control group and experimental group) and 
preflight Decision Making (Go or No Go). Results indicated that 19 (51.4%) participants in the 
experimental group decided not to Go on the proposed VFR flight plan compared to 13 (31.7%) 
 101 
participants in the control group (34%), indicating  a difference in proportions of .19,  that is not 
significant p = .078 (see Table 28).  
Table 28. 
 Preflight Test of Proportions Results 
     
  Go or No Go Decision 
 
No Yes 
Condition Count Percent Count Percent 
Control Group 13 31.70% 28 68.30% 
Experimental Group 19 51.40% 18 48.60% 
 
As a result, there is no support of the preflight hypothesis 4 and we do not reject the null 
hypothesis (see Table 29).  
Table 29.  
Hypothesis Testing: Four 
     
Hypotheses 
Null / 
Alternate 
Description Accept 
Do not 
Reject 
H
y
p
o
th
e
s
is
 4
 
H40 
Participants in the experimental group 
will not differ in their decision to Go or 
Not Go  
  X 
H4a 
More participants in the experimental 
group will Decide to Not Go than 
participants in the control group 
    
 
Additional Analyses Investigating Decision Making.  Results of the Test of Two 
Proportions revealed there was not a significant difference between Condition groups’ decision 
to fly. However, previous research indicates that decision-making may be affected by various 
factors other than weather and flight information, such as, social biases, risk tolerance, and the 
ability to plan an alternate airport and route changes. Another inspection of participant responses 
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revealed that the majority of experimental group participants reported, planning an alternate or 
planning to turn around as a reason for deciding to fly to fly the proposed VFR flight plan. 
Next, to gain more insight on participant responses regarding prefight decision-making, 
another Test of Two Proportions was run to assess group differences in the response to the 
following statement on the Post Preflight Survey, “Based on the provided information this flight 
should be safe to fly VFR and land at the proposed destination airport.” 
The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:  
• Dichotomous Variables: One Independent Variable and One Dependent Variable. 
This assumption was satisfied.  
• Independence of Observations. The assumption of independence of observations was 
satisfied. 
• Randomly Assigned Groups. The assumption of randomly assigned groups was 
satisfied.  
• Sample Size. The minimum expected frequency in any of the cells is 13.10, which 
is greater than 5. Therefore, the assumption of adequate sample size was satisfied 
The test of two proportions used was the chi-square test of homogeneity in order to compare 
differences in proportions for the PWDST condition (control group and experimental group) on 
responses to whether the VFR flight plan was safe for the flight to the destination airport. Results 
indicated that 17 (45.90%) participants in the experimental group disagreed that the flight was 
safe to fly VFR and land at the destination airport compared to eight (19.50%) participants in the 
control group. This was a statistically significant difference in proportions of .26,  p = .012. 
 
 103 
The next analysis  assessed the difference in condition groups’ responses to the following 
statement on the Post Preflight Survey, “This flight could be risky due to weather conditions.” 
Table 30.  
Preflight Decision Making Test of Proportions Results: Whether it is Safe To Fly VFR Flight 
  Safe To Fly VFR Flight  
 
Incorrect Correct 
Condition Count Percent Count Percent 
Control Group 33 80.50% 8 19.50% 
Experimental Group 20 54.10% 17 45.90% 
 
The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:  
• Dichotomous Variables: One Independent Variable and One Dependent Variable. 
This assumption was satisfied.  
• Independence of Observations. The assumption of independence of observations was 
satisfied. 
• Randomly Assigned Groups. The assumption of randomly assigned groups was 
satisfied.  
• Sample Size. The minimum expected frequency in any of the cells is 12.60, which 
is greater than 5. Therefore, the assumption of adequate sample size was satisfied 
To compare differences for condition (control group and experimental group) on responses 
on another item on the  Preflight Decision Making Test, “Riskiness of Flight Due to Weather”, 
another test of two proportions (the chi-square test of homogeneity) was used.   Results indicated 
that 18 (48.60%) participants in the experimental group agreed that the flight the flight could be 
risky due to weather conditions, compared to six (14.60%) participants in the control group. This 
was a statistically significant difference in proportions of .34,  p = .001 (See Table 31).  
 104 
Table 31.  
Preflight Decision Making Test of Proportions Results: Riskiness of Flight Due to Weather 
     
   Riskiness of Flight Due to Weather 
 
Incorrect Correct 
Condition Count Percent Count Percent 
Control Group 35 85.40% 6 14.60% 
Experimental Group 19 51.40% 18 48.60% 
 
Retest of Hypotheses Five, Six, and Seven. The initial/hypothesized Inflight MANOVA 
was intended to assess the effect of the PWDST on all Inflight measures (Inflight Weather 
Phenomena, Inflight Weather Trending, Inflight Risk, and Total Time in IMC). However, the 
data failed the majority of assumptions for the MANOVA analysis, and thus, these results were 
somewhat inconclusive. Therefore, as additional exploratory analyses, the differences between 
conditions on each inflight dependent variable were examined using a series of T-tests. For these 
T-tests, an adjusted alpha level of 0.0167 was necessary in order to avoid type 1 errors. 
PWDST Effect on Inflight Weather Phenomena 
An Independent Samples T-test was run to assess the difference between condition group 
responses on Inflight Weather Phenomena. 
The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:  
• Outliers. Boxplots developed and revealed there were no outliers. 
• Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated Inflight Weather Phenomena 
was not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < 
.05). 
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• Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. Levene’s test for equality of covariance 
matrices was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variances, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was satisfied (p = .685).  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the Inflight Weather 
Phenomena scores for the experimental and control group. There was no significant 
difference in scores for the control group (M = 65.85, SD = 29.33) and the experimental 
group (M = 59.01, SD = 31.57; t (76) = .099, p = .324, two-tailed). The magnitude of the 
differences in the means (mean difference = 6.84, 95% CI: –6.89 to 20.58) was very small 
(eta squared = .224). 
Table 32. 
 PWDST on Inflight Weather Phenomena T-Test Results 
         
  Control   Experimental       
 
n = 41 
 
n = 37 
   
Variable M SD   M SD t(76) p Cohen's d 
Inflight Weather 
Phenomena 
65.85 29.33   59.01 31.57 0.99 0.324 0.224 
 
 
PWDST Effect on Inflight Weather Trending 
A Independent Samples T-test was run to assess the difference between condition group 
responses on Inflight Weather Trending. 
• Outliers. Boxplots developed and revealed there were 10 outliers, all outliers were 
removed. 
• Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated Inflight Weather Trending was 
not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < .05). 
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• Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. Levene’s test for equality of covariance 
matrices was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variances, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was satisfied (p = .868).  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the Inflight Weather Trending 
scores for the experimental and control group. There was no significant difference in scores for 
the control group (M = 97.22, SD = 16.67) and the experimental group (M = 96.88, SD = 17.68; 
t (66) = .083, p = .934, two-tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean 
difference = .35, 95% CI: –7.97 to 8.67) was very small (eta squared = .002). 
 
Table 33.  
PWDST on Inflight Weather Trend T-Test Results 
  Control   Experimental       
 
n = 36 
 
n = 32 
   
Variable M SD   M SD t(66) p Cohen's d 
Inflight Weather Trend 97.22 16.67   96.88 17.68 0.08 0.93 0.002 
 
PWDST Effect on Total Time in IMC 
An Independent Samples T-test was run to assess the difference between condition group 
responses on Total Time in IMC. 
• Outliers. Boxplots developed and revealed there were 7 outliers, all outliers were 
removed. 
• Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated Inflight Weather Trending was 
not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < .05). 
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• Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. Levene’s test for equality of covariance 
matrices was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variances, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was violated (p = .000).  
Since the assumption of  homogeneity of variances was violated, A Welch’s t-test was 
conducted to compare the Total Time in IMC scores for the experimental and control group. 
Results indicate, there was statistically significant difference in scores for the control group 
(M = 340.50, SD = 495.73) and the experimental group (M = 60.71, SD = 89.83; t (69) = 3.05, p 
= .001, two-tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 279.79, 
95% CI: 120.25 to 439.32) was medium size effect (eta squared = .785). 
Table 34.  
PWDST on Total Time in IMC T-Test Results 
         
  Control   Experimental       
 
n = 41 
 
n = 30 
   
Variable M SD   M SD t(69) p Cohen's d 
Inflight Weather 
Phenomena 
340.5 495.73   60.71 89.83 3.05 0.001 0.785 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Figure 13. Dissertation Theoretical Model 
 
PWDST Effect on Preflight Performance 
 
Hypothesized Results 
 
The PWDST was designed to assist pilots with accessing, interpreting and applying 
weather products during weather preflight planning. Therefore, Hypotheses One, Two, and Three 
proposed that the PWDST would increase information acquisition (i.e., the number of key 
weather products pilots accessed during preflight weather planning) (H1) and, in turn, how 
accurately participants were able to report weather phenomena (H2A), weather trending (H2B), 
and overall weather risk for the proposed flight route (H3). These predictions were based on 
previous research citing preflight weather planning as a critical component in the development of 
pilots’ mental model of developing and present weather along their flight route (Lanicci et al., 
2012), as well as the efficacy of performance support tools in other domains (Barness, 
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Tunnessen, Worely, Simmons, & Ringe,1974; Miller, Chanllinor, Masarie, & Myers, 1986). (see 
Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. Effect of PWDST on Preflight Performance Hypotheses 
These hypotheses were partially supported. Results indicated that the PWDST had a 
significant effect on the percentage of key weather products that the pilots accessed during 
preflight, as well as how accurately participants were able to report the forecasted weather 
phenomena for their flight route. Although results indicated there was only a small correlation 
between percent of key products accessed and preflight weather phenomena, these results 
support previous research suggesting that the perceive (information acquisition), process 
(information assessment), and preform (information application) stages of preflight are 
sequential steps that are dependent upon each other (Parson et al., 2005). Participants in the 
PWDST condition received guidance from the performance support tool, on: 1) how to access all 
key products on the Aviation Weather Website,  and 2)  a review of each products’ purpose and 
limitations. (King, Blickensderfer, & Chaparro, 2019 (ref this HFES paper)). In turn, this 
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performance support led to an increase in the percentage of key products accessed by participants 
in the PWDST condition. Previous research indicates that gathering a variety of weather products 
can assist with building a more well-rounded mental model of present and developing weather 
(Vincent et al., 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that pilots who used the PWDST and 
accessed more key weather products, also reported weather phenomena more accurately then 
participants in the control condition.  
Hypothesis four proposed that more participants who used the PWDST (experimental 
group) would decide NOT to embark on the VFR flight plan, compared to participants who did 
not use the PWDST (control group). This hypothesis was developed based on previous research 
that suggests that when making decisions, operators depend on their long term memory, short 
term memory and stimuli to influence their choices and actions (Wickens, Gordon, Liu, & Lee, 
1998). During the perceive stage of the weather preflight process, pilots gather weather 
information and must fully process that information in order to gain a robust mental model of 
developing weather and, in turn, assist with decision-making (Parson et al., 2005). Decisions 
using weather mental models include route changes and, ultimately, the final decision of whether 
to embark on the flight plan or not.   
For the experimental task, participants were required to perform their preflight planning 
for a proposed VFR flight plan and ultimately decide, based on the information they gathered, 
whether they should embark on the VFR flight plan or not (Go or No Go decision).  (Note that 
the participants in this study were all non-instrument rated VFR Private Pilots, which means that 
regulations (FAA, 2020), prohibit them from flying into IMC.)   Hence, hypothesis four 
predicted that pilots using the PWDST (experimental group) would have a more clear 
understanding of the forecasted weather, and decide NOT to embark on the VFR flight as 
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compared to participants who did not use the PWDST (control group). This hypothesis was not 
supported. Results indicated that there was not a significant difference between experimental 
conditions and their decision to Go or Not Go. These results may seem odd, considering that the 
participants who used the PWDST:  1) accessed more key weather products and 2) seemed to 
have a better understanding of present and developing weather. Multiple factors exist, however, 
that could have contributed to the lack of significance in the go-no go decision.  
The factors include that, first, participants may have decided to fly the proposed VFR 
flight plan with plans to divert to an alternate airport, if the weather deteriorated. Second, 
participants may have felt social pressure to continue with the flight since they were getting paid 
to complete the entire research study. Lastly, participants may have felt the flight would be less 
of a risk since it is a simulated flight scenario.  
Exploratory Results 
 
Retest of Hypothesis Four. Exploratory analyses, revealed that numerous participants in 
the experimental group who made the decision to fly the VFR flight (i.e., decision to Go) also 
stated  “planning an alternate airport” as a reason as to why they decided to fly the proposed 
VFR flight plan. This inspection of the raw data, led to subsequent analyses which revealed that, 
despite a lack of significant difference between condition groups on the Go/No-Go decision. 
there was a significant difference between groups when responding whether the VFR flight plan 
was safe to fly as originally planned. More participants in the PWDST condition disagreed with 
the statement that it was safe to fly the proposed VFR flight plan and land at the destination 
airport, than participants in the control group. Additionally, when comparing responses between 
conditions on how much they agree with whether this flight is risky due to weather, there was a 
significant difference between group responses. More participants in the PWDST condition 
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agreed that the flight was risky due to weather compared to participants in the control group. 
These findings support previous research that indicates there are many factors at play when 
deciding to embark on a flight plan and include biases, social pressure, as well as flexibility of 
changing a flight plan, can be crucial components in preflight decision-making (NTSB, 2005).  
 
Preflight Performance Variables Ability to Predict Preflight Decision Making 
 
Hypothesized Results 
 
 Hypothesis Seven proposed that, aside from the PWDST itself, the preflight performance 
variables (i.e., Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight 
Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk) would predict whether participants decided to embark on 
the proposed VFR flight plan or not (see Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15. Preflight Performance Variables Predict Go No Go Decision (Hypothesis 7) 
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This hypothesis was developed based on previous research that suggests deciding 
whether to embark on a flight plan depends on multiple factors, and previous research indicates 
that information acquisition and analysis are key components in decision-making (Patel & 
Groen, 1991: Wiggins & O'Hare, 1995). Additionally, while decision-making biases may be a 
contributing factor for VFR into IMC incidents, other decision errors may be a result of poor 
preflight planning, limited aviation weather knowledge and skills, and in general, a lack of 
understanding of the existing and forecasted weather and it’s implication for flight 
(Blickensderfer et. al, 2017; FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2006). Therefore, it was hypothesized 
that preflight performance variables, such as Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight 
Weather Phenomena, Preflight Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk would predict whether 
participants decided to embark on the proposed VFR flight plan or not. This hypothesis was 
partially supported. Although the logistic regression model was statistically significant, results 
indicated only Preflight Risk uniquely contributed to the model. These results are unexpected, 
considering the literature supports that information gathered in the preflight process should guide 
preflight decision-making (NTSB, 2005). These results do not align with previous research that 
suggests that operators’ information selection could depict expertise and can be informative 
when assessing pilots’ decision-making in the preflight phase, where weather information is 
acquired and route and inflight decisions are determined (Wiggins, 2014). Further investigation 
into the data revealed these results could be due to the various limitations associated with this 
analysis, such as, limitations of the measures, a lack of linearity between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable and the two outliers left in the analysis.   
 
PWDST Effect on Inflight Performance 
 
 114 
Hypothesized Results 
 
Hypotheses Five and Six proposed that using the PWDST during preflight would have a 
positive effect on inflight performance including: Inflight Weather Phenomena (H5), Inflight 
Weather trending (H5B), and Total Time in IMC (H6) (see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. Effect of PWDST on Inflight Performance Hypotheses 
Again, these hypotheses were based on several areas of the literature. First, previous research 
which indicates that pilots rely on long term memory, feature cue association, and personal skills 
/ abilities in order to assess situational awareness and risk perception while inflight (Wiggins, 
2014; Hunter, 2002).  At the same time, previous research suggests that intermediate skill level 
operators have not fully established efficient expert level qualitative information processing 
which is necessary to process task related information and implement action effectively (Bell, 
1997). Thus, if pilots lack knowledge of aviation weather principles, it could hinder their ability 
to use cue utilization (external environmental cues and gathered information) and long term 
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memory to assess their situation (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Which in turn, can determine the 
quality of weather phenomena assessment and decision-making while inflight.   One strategy to 
help operators perform in these situations is to use a performance support tool.  Prior research on 
performance support tools has provided evidence that such tools do improve performance in a 
variety of fields (Barness, Tunnessen, Worely, Simmons, & Ringe,1974; Miller, Chanllinor, 
Masarie, & Myers, 1986).  Hence, it was hypothesized that using a performance support tool 
would improve pilots understanding of weather inflight. However, results indicated, the effect of 
PWDST on inflight performance was not significant. These findings are not aligned with the 
literature, which led to further investigation of these results. 
Exploratory Results 
 
Additional tests of Hypothesis Five and Six. Exploratory analyses investigated the effect of 
PWDST on each dependent variable separately and with all outliers removed. Results indicated, 
the PWDST did not have a significant effect on Inflight Weather Phenomena (H5) and Inflight 
Weather trending (H5B). However, the PWDST did have a significant effect on Total time in 
IMC (H6). The lack of effect of PWDST on Inflight Weather phenomena and Inflight Weather 
trending, could be due to the lack of construct validity and/or sensitivity of the measures.  These 
measures were developed for this dissertation and had not been used in prior research. In contrast 
to the Inflight survey measures, the total time pilots fly into IMC has been used successfully in 
previous studies as a measure for inflight performance (Johnson & Wiegmann, 2015).  
The current results about IMC are similar to findings in previous research that investigated  
interventions to aid pilots in avoiding inflight weather hazards. For example, Alhstrom (et al?) 
(2016) found that participants who had access to portable weather technology maintained a 
greater horizontal distance from degraded weather conditions (i.e., away from IMC) than 
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participants in the control group.  Other research indicated that pilots who received training on 
weather cue interpretation tended to deviate earlier when encountering hazardous weather 
conditions (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003).  In the current study, participants who used the PWDST 
received guidance on each weather product and guidance on risk that provided some level of 
warning about the effect of present weather conditions on flight. As a result, pilots that used the 
PWDST not only accessed a greater percentage key weather products, and had a better 
understanding of current weather conditions before flight, they also spent less time in IMC 
conditions.  
Inflight Performance Variables Ability to Predict Total Time in IMC 
 
Hypothesized Results 
 
Hypothesis Eight proposed that, PWDST aside, participant scores on Inflight Weather 
Phenomena, Inflight Weather Trend, and Inflight Weather Change would successfully predict 
pilots’ total flight time in IMC (see Figure 17)   
 117 
 
Figure 17. Inflight Performance Variables Predict Total Time in IMC (Hypothesis 8) 
Again, this was hypothesized based on previous research that suggests that situational 
assessment and feature cue association are essential for avoiding degraded weather conditions 
inflight (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Thus, pilots who have more accurate understanding of the 
inflight weather conditions were expected to have shorter times (if any) in IMC.  Pilots may 
encounter IMC as a result of an inadequate situation assessment of current and developing 
weather and the potential effects on flight. Although, results indicated the model was statistically 
significant, only Inflight Weather Phenomena was a statistically significant contributor to the 
model.   Inflight Weather Trend and Inflight Weather Change did not significantly contribute to 
the prediction of Total Time In IMC. Therefore, Hypothesis 8 is partially supported. These 
findings contradict theories in the literature claiming that weather inflight assessment and cue 
utilization are essential for IMC avoidance.  
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Several explanations exist as to why scores on weather trending and weather changes did 
not predict time in IMC.  First, the measures had not been used in prior research and, thus, the 
construct validity may have been suspect.  Additionally, the new measures may not have been 
fully sensitive to detect differing levels of understanding.   Finally, several statistical 
assumptions were violated for this analysis, including Homoscedasticity, Independence of 
Residuals, and Normality of the data. These violations could have impacted the reliability and 
validity of our results.  
Preflight and Inflight Performance Variables Relationships 
 
Hypothesized Results 
 
Hypothesis Nine proposed that Preflight risk mediates the relationship between the 
PWDST and Total Time in IMC (see Figure 18). This was hypothesized due to previous research 
that suggests inadequate preflight planning, poor decision-making, poor situational awareness, 
and inadequate risk assessment as key contributors to unintentional VFR into IMC (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2005). Prior research findings highlight how much preflight 
planning provides a foundation for inflight performance and situational awareness. Based on the 
argument for (but few empirical findings of), the impact of preflight weather planning on inflight 
performance, the current study investigated the relationship between preflight and inflight 
variables.  
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Figure 18. Preflight and Inflight Mediation Model (Hypothesis 9) 
Results indicated that no correlations between inflight and preflight variables existed. 
These results were not consistent with arguments on the importance of weather preflight in the 
general aviation guidance literature (FAA, 2008; FAA,  2019).  Further investigation into the 
relationship between Preflight Risk, Total Time in IMC, and the PWDST indicated, there was a 
significant direct relationship and a significant total effect of PWDST and on Total Time in IMC. 
However, the indirect effect of PWDST on Preflight Risk and Preflight Risk on Total Time in 
IMC was not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis nine was not supported. Although these findings 
do not reflect arguments in the literature, the results are not surprising, considering the lack of 
correlation between Preflight and Inflight variables. 
Key Findings 
 
To summarize, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of a performance support 
tool (PWDST) for weather preflight on pilots’ preflight performance and inflight performance. 
Results indicated that participants in the PWDST condition displayed better Preflight 
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performance than the control condition, specifically, a higher rate of Information acquisition 
(Percent of Key Products Accessed) and higher reported Weather awareness (Preflight Weather 
Phenomena). While there was no significant effect of the PWDST on the Go or No Go decision, 
further investigation did reveal PWDST had a significant effect on participants Preflight 
decision-making. More participants in the PWDST condition decided the flight was not safe to 
fly as planned without any flight plan changes and also reported the flight was risky due to 
weather. Additionally, Preflight performance variables did predict Preflight decision-making (Go 
or No Go decision), with Risk perception (Preflight Risk) uniquely contributing to the logistical 
model. Furthermore, when investigating the PWDST effect on Inflight performance, results 
revealed participants in the PWDST condition spent less time in IMC (Total Time in IMC) than 
participants in the control condition. However, there were no differences between conditions in 
Inflight Weather Awareness (Inflight Weather Phenomena and Inflight Weather Trending). At 
the same time, results did reveal the Inflight Weather Awareness (Inflight Weather Phenomena, 
Inflight Weather Trending, Weather Change) was able to successfully predict Inflight Decision 
Making (Total Time in IMC), with Inflight Weather Phenomena significantly contributing to the 
model. Lastly, although supported in the literature, study results revealed very little support for 
the relationship between preflight and inflight performance. 
Limitations 
 
There are several factors that may limit the findings and generalizability of this study. 
The sample for this study was limited and may not be representative of the overall General 
aviation community. Although participants were being compensated to complete the study and 
were instructed to treat this scenario as a they would a real flight, it is possible participants may 
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have taken more risks due to the scenario being simulated. The study was also approximately 
five hours long, and fatigue could have impacted participant’s performance. 
External Validity. Every effort was taken to try to increase and maintain the external validity of 
this study. The experimental task including simulated preflight weather planning and simulated 
inflight scenario. For both scenarios pilots were provided with the same materials they would 
have access to in real life, and when this was unavailable our team created very similar mock 
materials. These materials were developed by a multidisciplinary team of meteorologists, human 
factors specialists, and pilots of varying levels of experience. Weather data used for the Inflight 
scenarios was based on actual historic weather data, very few features were edited for simulation 
fidelity. Some limitations include the fidelity of the graphical depiction of weather in the 
Prepare3D software and it’s limitations on user depth perception. As well as, the altering of 
historical weather data in order to provide a more gradual VFR into IMC transition. There were 
also times where there were some technical difficulty with the PWDST and participants had to 
re-enter their information into the app.  
Construct Validity.  Although all the measures were developed with a multidisciplinary team, it 
is very difficult to measure accuracy on weather phenomena, trending, and weather risk 
perception. This has been cited as an issue in previous research and there are limited validated 
measures available for these constructs (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). During data processing each 
survey measures was assessed for reliability and as a result certain questions were removed to 
ensure reliability and this could have affected the overall construct validity of these measures. 
Statistical Validity. There are some issues regarding the statistical validity of this study. This 
study is slightly underpowered, with the optimum sample size being around 85 participants. 
Additionally, assumptions were violated for certain analyses, which could effect the validity of 
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these results. However, retesting with more appropriate analyses and tests were used in 
exploratory analyses to further investigate these findings. Assumption for the majority of the 
exploratory analyses were satisfied. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 
The findings in this study provide implications for the GA Weather community and our 
approach towards novice pilots’ lack of knowledge and skills, by investigating the effect of 
automated guided assistance throughout the preflight process (e.g. a performance support tool, 
PWDST) on preflight and inflight performance. Previous research indicates Private pilots 
account for the majority of GA weather-related accidents and VFR into IMC (Fultz & Ashley, 
2016). Previously cited contributing factors include weather knowledge and preflight planning 
(NTSB, 2005; Blickensderfer eta al., 2017.; Burian & Jordan, 2002). The PWDST focuses on 
improving preflight planning, in efforts to improve novice private pilots’ mental models of 
developing weather and weather-related flight risks by assisting with weather information 
acquisition, analysis, and application; while providing risk assessment guidance. Previous 
research suggests that limitations associated with weather information acquisition include the 
accessibility of weather products, insufficient understanding of weather product limitations, and 
the low level of product interpretability (Blickensderfer eta al., 2015; Lanicci et al., 2012). In the 
present study comparisons were made between groups provided with assistance in weather 
product accessibility, product limitation, and product interpretation. Unfortunately, there is no 
way of delineating exactly which aspect of the PWDST improved Information acquisition, 
preflight weather awareness, preflight and inflight decision-making. However, these results 
support previous research that suggests that sequential preflight stages, perceive, process, and 
perform, are building blocks for weather mental model development, preflight, and inflight 
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perceptions and decision-making (Lanicci et al., 2012; Parson et al., 2005;). It begs the question, 
how much weather training and weather knowledge is needed for novice pilots to understand 
weather information and make informed decisions, or whether the scientific communities’ 
approach to this issue has been wrong? Previous studies have tended to focus on developing 
more dynamic and graphical weather displays in and out of the cockpit, as well as operator 
training. Previous research on the  implementation of more graphical and dynamic weather 
displays tend to result in limited improvement in weather avoidance, instead, some of these tools 
were used to fly closer to hazardous weather (Burgess & Thomas, 2004). While other 
interventions, such as, weather training and portable weather devices resulted in increased 
weather situational awareness, although pilots still flew too close to degraded weather conditions 
(Wu, Gooding, Shelley, Duong, and Johnson, 2012; Ahlstrom et al., 2016). Few approaches have 
attempted to include interpretation guidance, risk guidance, as well as guidance on weather 
phenomena implications for flight. Perhaps, our approach should focus on increased product 
usability, accessibility, and guidance on information application, as well as risk. Although 
participants in the PWDST condition and Control condition only slightly varied in aviation 
weather knowledge, their differences in preflight performance and inflight decisions were 
significant. If this were a real life scenario, differences in performance between the PWDST 
condition and the control condition may have been a matter of life or death. 
This study also offers implications for research methodology in GA Aviation weather 
research. Previous studies investigating the effects of interventions on inflight weather avoidance 
rarely include a high fidelity simulation of the preflight planning process. This is imperative in 
order to truly understand how introduced interventions impact inflight decision-making. As 
previously stated, the preflight planning process is where the mental model and initial 
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perspective of the flight plan are formed. Continuing to conduct studies simply investigating 
inflight performance as an isolated event is unrealistic and can hinder the generalizability of the 
study findings. Results from this study, support the importance of including high fidelity 
preflight scenarios along with inflight scenarios to truly capture participant behaviors and 
performance that may have significant impacts on inflight performance. 
Future Research 
 
Future research should continue to investigate the relationship between Preflight and 
Inflight performance. As previously noted, the literature suggests a causal relationship between 
Preflight and Inflight performance. However due to the lack of reliable measures for preflight 
weather planning, there has been difficulty supporting this relationship (Blickensderfer et al., 
2017; Hunter, 2002; O’Hare, 1990; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). There are very few validated risk 
perception, aviation weather awareness, and decision-making measures available for research to 
adapt and use for their specific simulated scenario. Advancements in validated measure 
development is a critical component to understanding the GA weather problem.  
Further investigation should be invested in improving the quality of tools available to 
researchers to simulate preflight planning materials as well as, simulated depictions of weather 
and weather generation. A high fidelity simulated environment is required for an effective 
evaluation preflight performance and behaviors. Perhaps, the underlying reason why there are 
very minimal high fidelity studies that include the preflight process is due to the limited tools 
available to facilitate the production of needed materials (e.g. simulation of weather sources and 
flight planning devices). Currently, in order for researchers to develop preflight weather planning 
tools it requires a large team of diverse experiences, not many labs have the capability and 
funding to produce high fidelity environments and materials. In order to see an improvement in 
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the quality and generalizability of GA weather-related research, it is necessary to provide 
scientists with easily accessible platforms and tools. 
Although participants who used the performance support tool did have higher 
information acquisition, preflight weather awareness, and inflight decision-making, currently in 
this study, there is no way to determine which aspects of the intervention impacted these results. 
Further investigation should be invested into separately assessing the effects of guidance on 
weather information acquisition, weather interpretation, and risk guidance on preflight and 
inflight performance. 
Conclusion 
 
For decades GA has accounted for the majority of weather-related accidents. Although we 
have seen a slight decrease in the amount of GA weather-related accidents, the fatality rates 
remains relatively unchanged. Low hour Inexperienced Private pilots have incurred the majority 
of GA weather-related accidents, including VFR into IMC, which are the most lethal type of 
weather-related incident. Previous research cites poor preflight planning practices and a lack of 
aviation weather knowledge as key contributing factors to the high novice private pilot accident 
and fatality rate. Although multiple advances have been made in the presentation of weather 
products, few of these advanced have led to improved preflight and inflight performance. It may 
be beneficial to consider new methods towards improving low experienced pilots’ aviation 
weather practices. Perhaps by providing pilots with a performance support tool to aid them in the 
preflight process, pilots’ understanding of weather, decisions, and inflight weather-related 
behavior may improve. Thus, decision support tool technology could assist novice/intermediate 
pilots through the aviation weather preflight process. The purpose of this study was to investigate 
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the effect of a performance support tool for weather preflight (PWDST) on pilots’ preflight 
performance and inflight performance. 
Results from this study did provide more insight on preflight and inflight behaviors and 
performance. Study findings revealed the predictive relationship between risk perception during 
preflight planning and making go or no go decisions. Where, participants who displayed  more 
accurate preflight risk perception, also were more likely to decide not to fly. As well as, the 
predictive relationship between Inflight Weather awareness and decision-making. Where, 
participants who were more aware of inflight weather developments, were also more likely to 
spend less time flying in degraded weather conditions. Study findings also revealed the affect a 
preflight weather support tool can have on preflight and inflight performance. Results revealed 
that PWDST assisted low hour inexperienced private pilots with weather information acquisition 
and weather awareness during the preflight stage. Additionally, PWDST also assisted low hour 
inexperienced private pilots with deciding how save a flight plan is and whether there are any 
weather-related risks associated with a flight plan. The PWDST also assisted Low Hour 
Inexperienced pilots with weather avoidance. Findings from this study suggest that preflight 
weather performance support tools may be able to assist low hour inexperienced with preflight 
planning practices and inflight and preflight decision-making. Furthermore, perhaps by creating 
weather and flight planning technology that also helps with weather accessibility, weather  
interpretation, and risk assessment we could improve preflight practices as well as preflight and 
inflight decision-making. As the scientific community continues to understand the various factor 
involved in novice pilot preflight and inflight performance, it is crucial to continue to consider 
operator knowledge, skills, and needs. As a community, we should strive to develop assistive 
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technology to help fit and fill user gaps in skills and knowledge and not attempt to try to redefine 
our users’ roles to fit our design limitations. 
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Appendix F 
PWDST Usability Study 
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool (PWDST): User-Centered Design 
Process and Usability Validation 
 
Jayde King, M.S., John Kleber, B.S., Ashlee Harris, B.S., Barbara Chaparro, Ph.D., Beth Blickensderfer, Ph.D. 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL 
 
General Aviation flight operations have been negatively affected by the slow decreasing weather related accident 
rate for the last 20 years. Upon further investigation, research suggests, that poor preflight planning and a lack of 
aviation weather experience and knowledge may be contributing factors to the stagnant weather related accident 
rate. Our team developed a Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool (PWDST) to help novice pilots access, 
interpret, and apply weather information. We used a user-centered design process which involved an initial task 
analysis, low-fidelity prototyping, low-fidelity usability testing, user interviews and expert review. This study 
assessed and compared the perceived usability, difficulty, and the system assistance satisfaction of the PWDST. 
Participants (n=9) completed a usability study and a series of surveys during, as well as, after the completion of the 
preflight planning scenario. A series of Mann-Whitney U Tests were conducted to compare the difference between 
Private Pilot and Certified Flight Instructors (CFI) perceived usability, difficulty, and system assistance satisfaction 
ratings. Results indicated, there were no significant differences between group ratings. Overall, both groups reported 
above average usability, system assistance and low difficulty rating for the PWDST. Future research and possible 
implications are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The General Aviation (GA) weather 
related accident rate has remained the 
slowest decreasing accident rate within GA 
flight operations (FAA, 2010; Fultz & 
Ashley, 2016; AOPA, 2008). Previous 
research indicates the majority of these 
accidents result in fatalities, with Visual 
Flight Rule flight operations into Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (VFR into IMC) 
being the most hazardous type of weather 
related accident (FAA, 2010; Fultz & 
Ashley, 2016; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; 
AOPA, 2008). Primarily, low hour 
inexperienced private pilots incur the 
majority of weather related accidents 
(Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & Ashley, 
2016). Multiple sources have identified poor 
preflight planning and a lack of aviation 
weather knowledge and skills as a possible 
contributing factors for inadequate inflight 
weather avoidance and VFR into IMC 
incidents (Blickensderfer et.al,). To address 
this need, our team developed an aviation 
weather decision support tool. The tool is 
designed to assist low hour inexperienced 
private pilots with the aviation weather 
preflight planning process. The purpose of 
this study is to assess the usability of the 
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool 
(PWDST).  
 
Background  
Preflight Planning. Weather planning is 
a crucial component of the preflight 
planning process. During weather preflight 
planning pilots access multiple weather 
sources, interpret weather products, and 
develop a flight plan. This process is 
intended to better equip pilots with a mental 
model of current and developing weather 
conditions along their flight route. The FAA 
divides the preflight process into three major 
components, perceive, process, and perform 
(Parson et al., 2005).  
The weather preflight planning process 
begins with the “perceiving” phase, where 
pilots collect an array of weather  
 
 199 
 
 
 
 
products. During weather information 
acquisition pilots are able to search and 
navigate various weather sources of 
differing modalities to form a holistic mental 
model of prevailing and forecasted weather 
conditions, including: potable weather 
applications, websites, and call in services 
(e.g. Aviation Weather Center (AWC), 1-
800 Weather Brief Call-in, and Foreflight). 
However, a pilot’s ability to navigate these 
weather sources depends on the pilots’ 
familiarity with the source, the usability of 
the source interface, and the quality of the 
provided weather information. Therefore, 
limitations within the information 
acquisition stage may hinder the quantity 
and quality of information pilots receive, 
which may in turn result in an inadequate 
and inaccurate pool of weather information 
(Parson et al., 2005).  
After gathering all the weather 
information, pilots progress to the 
“processing” phase of the task (Parson et al., 
2005). Weather product interpretation can be 
quite challenging, especially for 
inexperienced pilots who lack foundational 
understanding of basic weather principles 
(Blickensderfer et.al, 2018). The majority of 
weather information is encoded and may 
require the user to access legends and/or 
have previous experience with the product to 
facilitate product interpretation (e.g. 
METARS, TAFFs, Wind Aloft, Station 
Plots). Failure to accurately interpret 
weather information could lead to a dismal 
distortion of the received weather 
information. Furthermore, defective 
reception of weather information can 
influence the pilot’s mental model of 
prevalent weather conditions and may result 
in hazardous weather behavior 
(Blickensderfer et.al, 2018).  
“Perform” is the final stage of the weather 
prefight planning process (Parson et al., 
2005). Subsequent to the interpretation of 
the received weather information, pilots 
must apply the extrapolated weather 
information to their current aeronautical 
flight plan. Considering this phase requires 
pilots to have correct completion of both the 
Perceiving, and processing phase, the 
perform stage may be the most challenging 
component of the entire task. Pilots need to 
understand the prevailing weather 
conditions, as well as, the flight safety risks 
each weather phenomena may pose for their 
specific flight plan. Therefore, this task will 
demand the user to function at a higher level 
of cognitive processing and may require 
previous experience.  
Since the weather preflight planning 
phase is a layered task, deficient 
performance on any weather planning phase 
could invalidate all the previous and future 
task phases. This may result in uninformed 
preflight and inflight decision making. 
Previous research highlighted poor product 
usability, inadequate weather knowledge 
and skills, risk assessment, and decision 
making as contributing factors for VFR into 
IMC incidents (NTSB, 2005; Capobianco & 
Lee, 2001). The effects of these contributing 
factors may begin in the preflight process 
and continue to develop throughout the 
inflight process, resulting in poor weather 
avoidance and hazardous inflight decision 
making.  
Decision Support Tools. A solution to 
the GA weather problem has been attempted 
from various perspectives and fields. This 
includes the development of increasingly 
adaptive and dynamic weather displays. 
Although the development of new weather 
technology for preflight and in the cockpit 
interfaces may improve certain aspects of 
situational awareness, the majority of these 
technological advances have failed to 
prevent hazardous weather encounters 
inflight (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; 
Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; Beringer and Ball, 
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2004). It may be that aviation weather and 
flight planning tasks are too complicated and 
cognitively taxing to simply be addressed by 
the introduction of new technologies. 
Instead, new approaches that compensate for 
the users’ lack of meteorological knowledge 
and skills is necessary to fill the gap 
between the user and the weather planning 
task. King, Ortiz, Blickensderfer, and 
Christy (2018) explored the possibility of 
applying Decision support tool technology 
to the aviation weather preflight planning 
task. Additionally, Ortiz, Blickensderfer, 
and Christy (2018) suggest decision support 
tool technology could address the disparity 
of skill and knowledge between the user and 
task, as well as, improve overall preflight 
and inflight performance. Furthermore, with 
certain precautions, a preflight decision 
support tool may offer just enough 
assistance to help novice private pilots 
operate at a higher level of performance and 
safety. In order to promote improved 
performance, King, Ortiz, Blickensderfer, 
and Christy (2018) suggest the preflight 
decision support tool should apply specific 
levels of automation to specific tasks, 
consider and avoid the negative impacts of 
automation, provide training for the preflight 
weather decision support tool, include a 
multidisciplinary team for product 
development, consider usability, and 
integrate system adaptability. 
 
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool 
Description & Development. In this study, 
our team developed a prototype preflight 
weather decision support tool (PWDST). 
The tool was developed by a 
multidisciplinary team including, two 
human factors specialists, a meteorologist, a 
private pilot, and a gold standard flight 
instructor. The purpose of the tool is to 
assist novice low hour private pilots with the 
weather portion of the preflight planning 
process. The PWDST assists pilots  
with accessing, interpreting, and applying 
weather information in context of their 
current flight plan. The PWDST uses a 
mixture of usability, low level 
information/analysis automation, and 
expertise knowledge to guide pilots through 
establishing their personal minimums, 
determining weather checking airports, 
accessing, interpreting, and applying 
weather information, and assessing weather 
risks. Each team member was included in 
the application development and beta 
testing.  
 
Figure 1. PWDST: Low Level Significant 
Weather Chart Section Flow  
 
 
Figure 1. PWDST: Low Level Significant 
Weather Chart Section. First, Participants 
view the homepage (a), then participants are 
introduced to the order for the preflight 
planning scenario. Next, participants are 
shown how to access each product on the 
Aviation Center Website (c through e), then 
participants are guided through product 
interpretation and asked prompting 
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questions to encourage the application of the 
interpreted weather information to their 
flight.  
 
PWDST Development  
The PWDST underwent four major 
phases of review and modifications. The 
first step in the PWDST development 
process included a thorough Preflight 
Planning Task analysis. This task analysis 
identified the major and minor possible 
limitations associated with completing 
weather preflight planning using AWC and 
traditional preflight planning tools. Next, we 
interviewed a series of private pilots and 
instructors to gain a better understanding of 
common hindrances to novice pilots while 
preflight weather planning. Through the use 
of target market feedback and Subject 
Matter expert guidance, we developed the 
first PWDT prototype. Next, the PWDST 
underwent an iterative process including a 
series of expert reviews and modifications. 
Data and feedback from expert reviewers 
and subject matter experts were incorporated 
into the future designs in order to improve 
the usability, as well as, content and face 
validity of the tool. Now, that we have 
completed the development process of our 
final prototype, it is imperative to observe 
and assess the usability of the interface and 
gauge users’ impressions of the system.  
 
METHOD 
 
Experimental Design  
The study was a mixed group design. 
The purpose of the study was to assess the 
usability of the PWDST tool, with 
consideration for experience. There were 
two levels of experience, the novice level 
included Private Pilots, while the expert 
level included Certified Flight Instructors 
(CFI). Both groups completed the same 
preflight scenarios using the PWDST tool. 
 
Participants  
Nine pilots (Mage= 24.11 (SD= 5.11)) 
from a Southeastern United States university 
were recruited to participate in this study. 
Four participants held a private pilot license 
(Mdnfigtht hours = 102.10 (SD= 55.00)) and five 
pilots were CFI rated (Mdnfigtht hours = 710.00 
(SD= 575.20). The majority of the 
participants completed their flight training at 
a Part 141 facility. The study was reviewed 
and approved in advance by the Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University Institutional 
Review Board for the protection of our 
participants. For incentive, each participant 
received $25 dollars for the completion of 
this study.  
 
Materials  
The following materials were used in 
this study: PWDST, PWDST Training 
Video, and the Simulated Preflight Task : 
Preflight Weather Decision Support 
Tool. The Preflight Decision Support Tool 
was wire-framed using Google Drive App 
Draw.io and the high fidelity mockup was 
created with AXURE software student 
license. The purpose of this tool is to guide 
users through the preflight process and 
improve preflight and inflight performance. 
The Preflight Weather Decision Support 
Tool (PWDST) is comprised of three main 
components, the preflight guide, the 
personal minimums sections, and the risk 
assessment and checklist output.  
PWDST Training Video. This six-minute 
video was developed using Microsoft Video 
Maker. The purpose of the training video is 
to guide users through the main components 
of the PWDST. The video illustrates how to 
navigate the tool’ preflight guide, the 
personal minimums sections, and the risk 
assessment and checklist output. 
 
Experimental Task: The task for this 
study required participants to perform a 
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preflight an aviation weather scenario. The 
flight scenario is a VFR Into IMC scenario. 
In the scenario, the scheduled flight route 
starts at the departure airport, KAEL, and 
ends at the destination airport, KDTL. 
During the preflight scenario, participants 
were asked to use the PWDST to access and 
interpret weather for their flight route. The 
following weather products were used in this 
scenario:  
• Big Picture Products: Low Level 
Significant Weather Chart, Surface 
Analysis, Satellite, Radar  
• Hazard Products: Convective 
SIGMETs and G- AIRMETs 
• Visibility Products: METARs  
 
Surveys Measures. All surveys were 
developed online using Qualtrics survey 
software. The participants completed all the 
surveys at the data collection site at their 
own pace. This study included the following 
surveys: 1) Demographic questionnaire, 2) 
After Scenario Questionnaire, 3) Subjective 
Mental Effort Questionnaire, 4) System 
Usability Scale, 5) and a Participant Rater 
Form.  
1) Demographic Questionnaire: The 
demographic survey is composed of 84 
items. The demographic survey items cover 
topics such as participant age, flight training, 
flight experience, weather training, and 
weather experience.  
2) After Scenario Questionnaire: The 
After Scenario Questionnaire is a user 
satisfaction survey (Lewis, 1991). This scale 
has three items that prompt participants to 
rate on a scale from 1-7 their overall 
satisfaction with the system. In this study, 
this scale was used to assess participants’ 
satisfaction with systems support and design 
for various assigned tasks and activities.  
3) Subject Mental Effort Questionnaire: 
This scale is a one item sale that measures 
participants’ perceived difficulty of tasks 
(Sauro & Dumas, 2009). The Scale ranges 
from (0) Not at all hard to do, (110) 
Tremendously hard to do, and (150). In this 
study, this questionnaire was used to assess 
participants perceived mental effort while 
completing various assigned tasks.  
4) System Usability Scale: This survey 
questions users on their perceived usability 
for a particular system (Brooke, 1996). The 
survey has 10 items; users are prompted to 
rate how much they agree with each item on 
a scale from one (Strongly Disagree) to five 
(Strongly Agree). This scale was used to 
survey participants’ overall impressions 
about the system.  
5) Participant Rater Form: These 
questions prompt the participant about their 
system assistance satisfaction and difficulty 
for completing each task. For the difficulty 
rating for completing each task using the 
PWDST, the options range from 1 (Very 
Difficult) to 7 (Very Easy). While for the 
system assistance satisfaction scale, 
participants are asked to rate their 
satisfaction with the support information 
provided by the PWDST for each task, with 
options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree).  
 
Procedure  
After an initial briefing, participants 
were asked to sign a consent form. Then 
participants used a computer to complete the 
online demographic questionnaire. Next, 
participants were briefed and trained on the 
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool 
and completed the post-training quiz. 
Participants then completed a series of 
activities using the Preflight Weather 
Decision Support Tool system on an iPad. 
For the activity, participants were asked to 
complete weather preflight planning using 
the app and access, interpret, and apply 
weather products from the Aviation Weather 
Center Website (AWC.org). After each 
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activity participants answered questions 
from Participant Rater Form. After all 
activities  
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were completed, participants completed the 
System Usability Scale, Subjective Mental 
Effort Questionnaire and the After- scenario 
questionnaire for their overall experience 
with the PWDT. Lastly, participants were 
debriefed and compensated.  
 
RESULTS 
 
A series of Mann-Whitney U-Tests 
were conducted in order to examine the 
differences in between Private Pilot and 
Certified Flight Instructors impressions, 
satisfaction, and rated usability of the 
PWDST application. Results indicated, there 
were no significant differences between 
Private Pilot and Certified Flight Instructor 
impressions, satisfaction, and rated usability 
of the app.  
 
System Usability Scale (SUS)  
For the overall system usability on a 
scale from 0-100, both groups rated the 
usability above 68, which is considered 
above average. Although, Private pilots 
reported a slightly higher system usability 
score, there were no significant differences 
between groups (U = 9.00, z = –.247, p = 
.81, r = - .08).  
 
After Scenario Questionnaire  
Overall system satisfaction was 
reported on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), both groups 
average rated the overall system satisfaction 
above 5. Results indicated, there were no 
significant difference between groups for 
overall system satisfaction (U = 7.00, z = –
.747, p = .46, r = -.25). However, Private 
pilots’ reported system satisfaction was 
slightly higher than CFI reported system 
satisfaction.  
 
Subjective Mental Effort Questionnaire  
Overall perceived difficulty completing 
tasks using the PWDST system was reported 
on a scale from (0) Not at all hard to do, 
(110) Tremendously hard to do, and (150). 
In this study both groups average rating was 
lower than 25, A bit hard to do. Results 
indicated, there were no significant 
difference between groups for overall 
system satisfaction (U = 9.00, z = –.256, p = 
.80, r = -.09). However, Private pilots’ 
reported system satisfaction was slightly 
higher than CFI reported system satisfaction.  
 
Participant Rater form  
For each product within the Big Picture, 
Hazards, And Visibility product sections, 
participants completed a difficulty scale 
with options ranging from 1 (Very Difficult) 
to 7 (Very Easy). Additionally, participants 
also completed a satisfaction scale for each 
product with options ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Six 
Mann Whitney U Tests were ran to compare 
means between Private Pilots and CFI, 
results indicated, there were no significant 
difference between groups for participant 
rated difficulty and satisfaction with system 
assistance for: Big Picture (rated difficulty: 
U = 3.5, z = -1.63, p = .10, r = -.05) (rated 
system assistance satisfaction: U = 4.00, z = 
-1.50, p = .14, r = -.05), Hazards (rated 
difficulty: U = 9.50, z = –.13, p = .90, r = -
.04) (rated system assistance satisfaction: U 
= 7.00, z = –.81, p = .42, r = -.03), and 
Visibility products (rated difficulty: U = 
2.00, z = –.2.16,  
p = .03, r = -.72) (rated system assistance 
satisfaction: U = 5.50,z=-1.15,p=.25,r=-.38).  
Table 1: Survey Measure Mean Scores for 
Private Pilots and Certified Instructors.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Results indicated there were no significant 
differences between Private pilots and CFI 
impressions, system assistance satisfaction, 
and perceived usability of the PWDST 
application. Furthermore, Private pilots 
reported higher ratings for usability, system 
satisfaction, and lower ratings for subjective 
mental effort. Although, the PWDST was 
initially designed to assist low hour private 
pilots through the weather preflight planning 
process. Results suggest that despite the 
difference in flight experience and training 
both groups had positive feedback about the 
application’s support information and the 
overall usability for weather preflight 
planning tasks.  
Further research should be invested into 
a more detailed analysis of each application 
interface and the various possible errors and 
limitations the application may introduce 
during each phase and task of the preflight 
planning process. Additionally, future 
research should be invested into 
investigating the effects the PWDST may 
have on preflight and inflight performance 
for novice and experienced pilots.  
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the organization with which they 
are affiliated.  
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